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Preface
In the summer of 2016, while assembling the scaffolding for this thesis, I came
upon this image at McGill University’s McLennan Library. With astonishing serendipity,
it was displayed with other rare Jewish books and manuscripts from theological tracts
from Early Medieval Cairo to Yiddish translations of Spinoza, Emerson, and Hughes.
Unlike the ancient leaflets or translations of paradigmatic thought, this illustration found
its way into the rare books section because of how easily it could have not existed.
Originally printed 1926 in a book of Yiddish poems by forgotten author and illustrator
Berele Hagay, under the pen name Hayim Goldberg, the drawing depicts a deep struggle
to reconcile Jewish thought and history in a world that increasingly stigmatized it. Not
only would Hagay perish in the Holocaust, but Yiddish Warsaw and the Jewish
Weltanschauung he offers up for rumination are little more than ashes.
The image, entitled “On Olympus,” depicts a Purim Roast. Both Jewish and nonJewish literary, artistic, and philosophic figures such as Goethe, Mendelssohn, Homer,
Monet, Dante, S. Ansky, Heine, Maimonides, Shakespeare, and Rembrandt. In the
foreground one can see Raphael reaching out toward a cup balanced of Schopenhauer’s
head. Meanwhile, Sholem Aleichem is holding onto I. L. Peretz’s feet, as Peretz peers
down at the music and dancers below. The Purim roast, or Spiel, is the annual opportunity
to poke fun, satirize, and humorously criticize the one’s company. Simply, Hagay
diagrams the way he imagines his influential textual acquaintances mocking his earthly,
contemporaries and their milieu.
This dynamic, between imaginary historical influences and a schema of identity
and culture in the present, animated Jewish life and thought before the Holocaust.
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European Jews stood at the margins of their society, borrowing from it while bringing
their own textual nexus to light. On one hand, Jewish modernity was characterized by this
struggle to reconcile contemporary and historical relationships to produce a meaningful
Judaism. As a result, Hagay’s moment consisted of committed, contradictory, and deeply
historical embedded varieties of Jewishness. On the other hand, these perspectives shared
a certain level of marginality. Even those who escaped this marginality were notable
through their lack there of. While clearly academic in language and agenda, this thesis is
also a story of the marginalized that details the challenges, opportunities, and liabilities of
inbetweenness.
The concept Hagay’s illustration illustrates with such clarity is that
marginalization entails ambiguity within social taxonomies, models for describing who
we are in relation to others. This ambiguity naturally offers a wealth of resources: unlike
someone who fits neatly within one social category, an ambiguous person can draw from
the entire scope of many categories. This natural wealth is underscored by a mathematical
problem. While the marginalized person holds great social wealth they can draw from,
they must always represent themselves as a singular person. This mandate to butcher the
many potential selves, in order to sculpt a single human, demands great internal violence.
Hagay depicts the empowerment and beauty of marginality. He shows that the many
sources and voices one can access will always mock, criticize, and stand above the
worldly, fragmented single human. The Zionist movement was and is the ultimate
rejection of this appreciation of life at the margins. It shows the violent side of
marginality and a hatred of the internal mockery and criticism, which, in the case of the
Zionists, ultimately resulted in the sublimation of this internal violence onto the
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Palestinians. This paper tells the story of Zionism in the language of the universal, not as
the world-historic realization of the Jewish people, or as a simply modern phenomenon.
Instead, it is an episode in tradition of global exile and marginality articulated with
modern peculiarity, idiosyncrasies, and unique, tragic ironies.

9

Chapter One: Introduction
Zionism, the movement to create a Jewish “homeland,” in Palestine, is in crisis.
Across the world, many Jews in diaspora who have placed their faith and advocated the
necessity of the project feel shocked to find themselves standing in similar positions to
the variety of ideologies that sought to immolate global Jewry throughout the 18th and
19th century. In this thesis, I explore the origins and future of the contradiction of
Zionism. The crisis these have developed is not limited to the heavily reported and
studied conflict with the Palestinians, though certainly this is the most salient and
important manifestation. Zionism is not a political opinion, but a way of seeing the world
and making history manifest in the present. As a nearly omnipresent imaginary, Zionism
not only impacts the relation of the Zionist to the Palestinian, but all Zionist relations,
along with the world they inhabit and belong in. This imaginary is reinforced by day-today practices, ideological state apparatuses, and a world-historical narrative that informs
the community, “how they got to where they are.”
To invalidate this imaginary is the task of a project much larger than this paper (if
it can be the job of a paper at all). Instead, I want to examine the roundabout motion the
Jew had made from oppressed to oppressor and how that has changed the landscape of
narratives. The Jews have loomed disproportionately large as characters in the world of
stories. Antisemitism depended upon the ability to tell these stories and place the Jew in a
number of demonized positions. The phenomenon this paper will study is how
perspectives on Jewish identity and the non-Jewish co-constitution and rejection of this
identity, have been interpreted by the Zionist project. Beyond the academic agenda of this
study, I want to bring to light the how historical assumptions and contradictions of the
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Zionist project, necessary for the ingathering of the Jewish diaspora into a state, have
made certain perspectives on Jewish identity and belonging untenable. I believe by
identifying these contradictions and laying bare the stasis they produce by undermining
Jewish pluralization (active pluralism), we can better identify better alternatives.

1.2 Why it Matters
Israel and Zionism are paradigmatic globally. Certainly, many people’s
livelihoods are directly caught up in a variety of conflicts with Israel. However, the
intensive study and research on Israeli/Palestine and the Jewish people heightens the
importance of the issue. It becomes the case par excellence for studies of exile, refugees,
religious persecution, migration, and nationalism. Beyond its academic importance, Israel
and Palestine both exemplify some of the global problems impacting persons around the
world. Zionism is formulated to solve the problems of diaspora and minority living in the
face of nation-states which structurally insist on internally homogeneous populations.
This dynamic between diaspora and nation, between exile and belonging, are the tensions
that pervade global communities and serve as the ideological means by which the
hegemonic classes stay in power. In this regard, Israel/Palestine is also the testing site for
the world order. Zionism confirms a series of limitations on the functional and ethical
possibilities of our world. It determines that diaspora is a depleted mode of living and that
the nation-state is the only valid form for a modern community. It affirms the recent
notion that exiles and refugees are naturally produced and that their lack of belonging is a
natural piece of the human condition. For those trapped in the conflict, for those invested
academically, for those affected or oppressed by ideological axioms Israel supports, this
topic is of the utmost importance.
11

1.3 Methodology
The method of inquiry is heavily influenced by the work of Hannah Arendt.
Following Walter Benjamin, Arendt saw history as non-linear. Instead, it was mostly
cyclical, statically reproducing the current paradigm though violent means. However,
quite often, especially once the current paradigm becomes unsustainable, people are
forced to come together and engage in political action. The cyclical reproduction of the
paradigm and the eventual breakdown of this stasis prescribe a historical analysis that
locates internal contradictions, structures of reproduction, and opportunities for coming
together. Within this paper, these important markers occur within the context of the
ambiguity of Jewish social belonging and the way the image of the Arab is implicated
within this discourse. Zionist attempts to give an account of the place of Jews in the
world created contradictory responses. As opposed to coming to a dialectical synthesis,
these contradictions are maintained through violence. Through the reproductive
apparatuses of the state, the Zionist abstraction of Jewish belonging gains a life of its
own, enforcing its reality upon the material world. Arendt and Benjamin both use history
to locate cracks, moments ripe for spontaneity and action, to flash up and shatter the
violent reproduction of the hegemonic ideology. For both, this means paying special
attention to the modes that offer alternatives to the present while also being muted by it,
thus requiring the work of the historian to give them voice.

1.4 Thesis
The common account of Zionism tell us that the overwhelming antisemitism of
nineteenth and twentieth century produced on obvious necessity for an autonomous
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Jewish state outside of Europe. While antisemitism is a piece of the driving force behind
Zionism, it is not the whole. In this paper, I argue that Zionism attempted to remove the
ambiguous status Jews held in European social taxonomies by positing a Jewish identity
through the oppositional binaries used to evidence a Eurocentric worldview. To realize
this identity, Zionists assembled the history of the Jews and their interlocutors to
corroborate this account. Zionists sought that this new identity produce a new age of
Judaism, creating a radical break from the past that rendered all other interpretations of
Judaism invalid and untenable. The urge to create a pristinely definable and intelligible
Jew, mixed with the conditions of settler colonialism and the existential fear and social
uprooting of the Holocaust, created the need for Zionists to cleanse the Jewish polity of
any alternative narratives of belonging. As a result, the Palestinian and diasporic Jewish
modes of belonging, latent within the land and subjects, were denied the right to appear
in public. By removing the ground for dissent by those who “belong,” the Zionist project
lost its ability reevaluate its own goals and ethic, removing the presence of the “other”
with vigor beyond reason or restraint, leading to ideological stasis. To escape the cyclical
self-constitution of Zionist violence and suppression, I turn to Edward Said and Hannah
Arendt’s reading of the history and political significance of Jewish Cosmopolitanism,
which identifies belonging in within ambiguity, as a way to share the means of narration.

1.5 Structure of Thesis
This thesis is separated into six interlocking sections. First, very briefly, I have
outlined my agenda, why I found it worth investigating, and why my investigation is
meaningful for a wide-audience. Next, I build the conceptual framework for the piece.
Here, I employ the systematic theory of Hannah Arendt to discuss the relationships of
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politics, narration, and violence. Within this context, I dissect Edward Said’s analysis of
Orientalism using Arendt’s framework. Afterwards, I review the genesis of the Zionist
ideology. In this first phase, I integrate a variety of primary voices and modern reflections
on early Zionism as it was first formulated in Europe. I locate this within the political and
cultural environment of the day and offer some brief reflections on the strengths and
liabilities of the ideology within its original historical context. Next, I examine the
formulation of Zionism within the Middle East by discussing the way the European
thoughts were revised to meet the necessary settler colonial practices. The utopian
dreams of the romantic Germanic Zionists were realized with revolutionary zeal. Yet, the
implementation of Zionism presented many unpredictable challenges. Instead of
addressing them to create a more flexible ideology, Zionism resorted to overwhelming
the voices of dissent. Despite this, the changes in the world order at the mid-19th century,
Zionism was able to cement itself as the primary interpretation of Jewishness in the
modern world.
After this, I turn back to Said and his interlocutors to describe and analyze the
way Zionists confronted the indigenous population and their neighbors. In doing so, I
want to expose the roots of the Israel/Palestine conflict, not only within Zionism, but to
the colonial notions the ideology was premised upon. Furthermore, I briefly survey the
way Israel investment in military and development of social institutions through the
military have made the ability of Israeli Jews to think of alternatives to Zionism nearly
impossible. Finally, I interpret the conflict through the shared tradition of Said and
Arendt’s thought: Jewish Cosmopolitanism. Through this frame, I explore ethical
alternatives and ways out of the traps of Zionism. I try to demonstrate why the trends and
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processes of globalization will only compound the difficulties and continue to bring
Zionism deeper into crisis. These new ethical stances are at once about sharing land
between Jews and Palestinians, addressing the failures of Zionism in ways besides
overwhelming violence, and edifying the importance of the Jewish voice in modern
times.

15

Chapter Two: Concept Overview
Zionism is best conceived of as a revolution against Jewish ambiguity. To
understand the scope of this claim, it is important to examine the place of ambiguity and
definition within societies and politics. Belonging is the fluid and changing negotiation of
a subject’s place in the intersubjective public sphere. The inescapable condition of human
plurality makes a utopian full belonging impossible. Meanwhile, without a claim to
belong, one becomes superfluous to the community. The fact that humans are social
beings, traps them between the impossibility of full belonging and the slavish terror of
not belonging. Within this paradox, public identity contently moves between belonging
ambiguously and clearly within an explicit order. With this view, Zionism is less of a
movement towards disambiguation than a rejection of manifold forms of ambiguity.
Before investigating the creation, implementation, and crisis of Zionism, this
section defines the conceptual language used throughout the thesis and the
interconnections between these concepts. This requires some backtracking. This concept
overview begins with Arendt’s reflection on Aristotle’s philosophy, in order to sharpen
the use of politics and the “good life” by liberating it from the economic notions that
dominate its analytic function today. Next, it explores the necessity of politics for
cohabitation through Arendt’s conceptions of narration and belonging. Through the
mediums of political action and storytelling, humanity engages in cyclical and unending
processes of obscuring and explicating belonging. This motion is a necessity for a society
to represent the experiences of its members. However, when one perspective dominates a
discourse, they are able to remove this motion, replacing dynamic politics with selfreferential representations. In Orientalism, Edward Said concretely describes how the
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hegemonic power is able to withdraw the representation of the “Oriental” from any
dynamic or intersubjective discourse. After exploring the problem of static
disambiguation through self-constituting representation, this section continues to
Arendt’s examination of the Pariah as the catalyst for a radical universalism.

2.1 Political Action
Hannah Arendt’s philosophical project employs comparisons between Hellenistic
political life and the cruelties of modern politics that pervaded her personal life. To
understand Arendt’s categorical analysis of modern politics, one must first survey the
landscape of ancient politics she receives from Aristotle. In Aristotle’s Greece, life was
divided between the household and the polis. The household (oikia) was the site of
private life where the master of the family, the paterfamilias, (oikonomos) would manage
the affairs of the clan (genos). The private life of the household was composed of
explicitly hierarchical power structures where the activities of each member followed the
paterfamilias’s prescription according to proto-bureaucratic goals of functionality and
stability. In the polis, the paterfamilias stood on equal ground their fellow heads of
households. Here, they would debate the issues confronting the diverse interests of each
master on the basis of truth and morality.
The Hellenistic philosopher was tasked with determining truth and justice.
Arendt’s interest revolves around the relation of politics, production, and position in the
polis. As Marcel Hénaff writes:
What is good wealth? Aristotle’s answer is wealth that stems from the
activity of the oikonomos – the master of the household – and proceeds
from a property. Aristotle defines property (ktēsis) as… “A possession
(ktēma) is an instrument (organon) for maintaining life.” (Pol. 1.1253b30)
But this life as subsistence is life within the circle of the oikos. Property
has to be defined by its position within the space under the responsibility
17

of the oikonomos who is expected to direct the instrument (organon)
toward its goal (telos), to unify and direct mere living (zen [bios]) toward
the good life (eu zēn). It is therefore necessary for property to be and
remain included within action and not become an autonomous instrument.1
For Aristotle, the affairs of production and economy (from oikonomos) are limited to the
realm of means: the only just purpose of production is the protection of physical life
(bios). Thus, production is a limited part of human communities because, “life is action
(praxis) and not production (poiēsis).” (Pol. 1254a7-8)
Action is separate from production because it is an end in itself. Unlike
production, it cannot be divided into discrete results and it cannot be undone or unmade.
“In this it remains immaterial; its time is the living present, but it is a continuous present.
Action is not a particular way of living, but the very movement of living. Because it is
not defined by an external result, action finds its closure within itself.”2 Production is a
means of sustenance. What do we sustain ourselves for? Action. Thus, it is action that
separates mere life from the good life.
The Hellenic paterfamilias manages his household with maximum efficiency and
order. If he is successful, his pantry gathers food, he accumulates fibers for the women of
his house to spin, and amasses slaves for labor. However, he does these things because
his household and property are his entry ticket to the public sphere. The historical
importance of understanding of household accumulation for Arendt becomes clear when
the citizen is compared to the slave. The distinction between slave and citizen was the
separation of outsiders from insiders.3 The status of slave did not limit a person’s

1

Hénaff, Marcel., Jean-Louis Morhange, and Anne-Marie Feenberg-Dibon. 2010. The Price of Truth : Gift,
Money, and Philosophy.Cultural memory in the present; Cultural memory in the present. Stanford, Calif.:
Stanford University Press. Page 82.
2
Ibid. Page 83.
3
Finley, Moses I. 1997. The Ancient Economy.Enskede: TPB. Page 70.
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potential modes of labor, but formally constrained their social belonging. By definition,
the slave is a stranger in a society that is not their own.4 The result of their misplacement
was that they were banished from politics: the slave did not exist in public. Crucially, this
distinction between slave and citizen displays that Greek politics and the contemporary
concept of social belonging or, even more anachronistically, social capital were one and
the same.
Arendt defines modernity as “the break with tradition.” Truth located in human
activities is uprooted and replanted. The “break” does not insinuate an end of tradition,
but the detachment of tradition from historical positions of authority. The changes in the
sites of truth uncoupled society and politics. Arendt writes:
The emergence of society – the rise of housekeeping, its activities,
problems, and organizational devices – from the shadowy interior of the
household into the light of the public sphere, has not only blurred the
boarder between private and political, it has also changed almost beyond
recognition the meaning of the two terms and their significance for the life
of the individual and the citizen.5
The emergence of society, from its clear subservience to politics, entails a new form of
equality. In the household, all members were equal before the despotic rule of the
paterfamilias. In society, the sovereignty of the head of the household is replaced by,
“one common interest and one unanimous opinion…enforced by sheer number.”6 After
the break with tradition, authority loses it bond with aristocratic hierarchy. Social
authority was no longer determined by place of birth. However, Arendt insists, the
problems of natality persist through the break.

4

Graeber, David. 2011. Debt : The First 5,000 Years.Brooklyn, N.Y.: Melville House. Page 146.
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition.Charles R. Walgreen Foundation lectures; Charles R.
Walgreen Foundation lectures. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Page 38.
6
Ibid.
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Humankind is fundamentally a social being. By virtue of birth, all of us are fated
to live amongst people different than ourselves. Modern equality removed the structures
that formerly designated politics as the site sine qua non for negotiating human pluralism.
Instead, society prescribes each social identity certain behaviors, values, and interests so
that plurality can be managed without active participation by each community or, in
Aristotelian terminology, each household. Instead of active negotiation and confrontation
of politics, society predicates the right to public appearance on a rational self-discipline to
achieve an accepted mode of behavior. With the break with tradition, the public realm
shifts from a political paradigm to an economic version. On this, Arendt writes:
This modern equality, based on the conformism inherent in social and
possible only because behavior has replaced action as the foremost mode
of human relationship, is in every respect different from equality in
antiquity…to belong to the few “equals” (homoioi) meant to be permitted
to live among one’s peers…The public realm, in other words, was
reserved for individuality; it was the only place where men could show
who they really and inexchangeably were…It is this same conformism, the
assumption that men behave and do not act with respect to each other, that
lies at the root of the modern science of economics, whose birth coincided
with the rise of society and which, together with its chief technical tool,
statistics, became the social science par excellence. Economics…could
achieve a scientific character only when men had become social beings
and unanimously followed certain patterns of behavior, so that those who
did not keep the rules could be considered to be asocial or abnormal.7

Following Marx, Arendt identifies the centrality of new kinds of exchange and
commensurability to the ways modern societies imagine themselves. In the polity
paradigm, the interdependence of multiple distinct, incommensurable identities drove
them to politics as a way to confront and accommodate these differences. In the modern
social paradigm, identities, like commodities, are no longer valued for their subjective
use or activity, but are assumed to belong to a single field of valuation. Identity becomes
7

Ibid. Page 41-42.

20

exchangeable and commensurable because it becomes secondary and deferential to
behavior.
From the juxtaposition between the polity and the society, Arendt devises three
broad classifications of human activity: labor, work, and action. In labor, “men produce
the vital necessities that must be fed into the life process of the human body.”8 Thus,
labor never achieves an end. It is endlessly, cyclically repetitive. Labor produces goods
for consumption, which hold no expectation of durability or meaning beyond the
fulfillment of necessity. Meanwhile, work produces objects that are made to be used, but
to not disappear after use. “They give the world the stability and solidity without which it
could not be relied upon to house the unstable and mortal creature that is man.”9 In order
for humankind to raise their claim to subjectivity, we must build an objective
environment that mediates between humanity and nature. Man does not fabricate
meaning from his natural environment, but builds a world between him and the latter.
While repetition characterizes labor, multiplication typifies work. While a carpenter
constructs many tables, these tables are not bound to biological processes of consumption
and sustenance. Work is far more durable than labor, but is not irreversible.
Action is distinct from labor and work because it is irreversible and an end in
itself. Action is not an eternal value hidden in the psychology of all mankind, but is a
necessary activity for the conditions of being human:
Wherever men live together, there exists a web of human relationship
which is, as it were, woven by the deeds and words of innumerable
persons, by the living as well as by the dead. Every deed and every new
beginning falls into an already existing web, where it nevertheless
somehow starts a new process that will affect many others even beyond
8

Arendt, Hannah, P. R. Baehr, and Rogers D. Spotswood Collection. 2003. The Portable Hannah Arendt.
New York: Penguin Books. Page 170.
9
Ibid. Page 173.
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those with whom the agent comes into direct contact. It is because of this
already existing web of human relationship with its conflicting wills and
intentions, that action almost never achieves its purpose.10
By virtue of being born, every human comes from somewhere and does so at a certain
time. The impossibly complex, mobile, and self-organizing properties of large-scale
social relationships insist that action serves as an end in itself and that its results cannot
be reversed. Action also demands two prerequisites: freedom and plurality. Freedom is
not simply the ability to do otherwise; it is the ability to start something new or
unexpected. Freedom is manifest in human spontaneity and our confrontation with the
novel. Pluralism is inherent in any human community: difference of opinion and will
within a group of people is a constant in human history. However, pluralism threatens
modern society, which insists upon a minimum of conformism and standardization to
maintain large political and economic communities.

2.2 Narration and Storytelling
While Arendt’s philosophy employs the social arrangements of the polis, it is the
comparative work between modern society and the Hellenic world that drives her
philosophy. She proposes a compromise between traditional philosophy, which believed
that a truth existed independent from humankind, and modern philosophy, which
determined that man made the truth. Instead, she proposes that contemporary political
thought substitute the traditional category of truth with the inescapable conditions of
human social worlds. “Conceptually, we may call truth what we cannot change,

10
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metaphorically, it is the ground on which we stand and the sky that stretches above us.”11
The truth consists of the conditions that humankind can never escape or change.
The irrevocable conditions that Arendt determines most influential to humanity
are natality and mortality: that everyone must be born to exist and that everyone must die.
Therefore, Man is not only forced to live amongst other people, but he is forced to live
among people who have different lived experiences. As a result, humans must develop
commonalities and modes of understanding differences. As Jackson writes, “[I]n every
human society, the range of experiences that are socially acknowledged and named is
always much narrower than the range of experiences that people actually have.”12
Political action reforms, revises, and revalues the public sphere to meet private and
personal experience. The prerogative that drives man to politics is the need for
“rootedness” or belonging within the named and acknowledged order.
For Arendt, the search for belonging demands cyclical movement between
subjective, private, contemplative life and intersubjective, public, active life. However,
because the conditions of natality and mortality insist that both the subjective and
intersubjective are always changing, the exchange between the two is endless and an “end
in itself.” Politics fulfills the fundamental precondition for living amongst other people.
When people come together with the ability to rework the public order to better root
themselves within the social collectivity, it allows for members of the polity to adapt their
belonging in tandem with the ebbs and flows of morality and natality.
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Conceived in this way, storytelling becomes the necessary medium of politics, As
Jackson writes, “storytelling is never simply a matter of creating either person or social
meaning, but an aspect of the ‘subjective-in-between’ in which a multiplicity of private
and public interests are always problematically in play.”13 Through narratives, subjective
lived experiences become articulable within the public realm and how political action,
once completed, can contextualize and prescribe future action. However, Arendt’s
standards for storytelling as a “subjective-in-between” are exceptionally rigorous. As
Julia Kristeva writes:
Arendt does not believe that the essential feature of narration can be found
in the fabrication of coherence within the narrative or in the art of spinning
a tale…In Arendt’s view the most important thing in the narrative
testimony is to recognize the “moment of accomplishment” and to
“identify the agent” of the story. The art of the narrative resides in the
power to condense the action into an exemplary space, in removing it from
the general flow of events, and in drawing attention to a “who.”…A
narrative of this sort, one that is formulated in the web of human
relationships and that is fated to the political in-between, is fundamentally
bound up with action. It can manifest that essential logical process only if
it becomes action itself. In other words, such a narrative must expose itself
and act as if it were “drama” or “theater” and as if it were “playing a role.”
Only then can muthos [narrative] remain energeia [actualized]. If narrative
is to become a means of disclosure and not simply remain stuck in
reification, it must be acted out. Opposing the static mimesis Arendt
reclaims gestural theater as the modus operandi of the ideal narrative.14
Just as action requires narrative, narrative requires action: they are two sides of the same
coin. Again, perpetual circling between two potentially static objects emerges as a central
pattern to Arendt’s understanding of human flourishing (zen).
The symbiotic relationship between political action and contemplation entails the
enacted narrative as catalyst between the two. Thus, not only is, “storytelling a strategy
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for transforming public meanings,” but also, “a vital human strategy for sustaining a
sense of agency in the face of disempowering circumstances.”15 As opposed to a tool for
organizing social life, narrative becomes imperative for existential rootedness and
belonging in a fundamentally plural and changing world. More simply, because the
intersubjective cannot reflect the broad spectrum of the subjective, narration will always
be a sight of conflict. In any social arrangement, only so many stories can be publically
meaningful and only so many interpretations of those stories appear valid and able to
disclose subjective truths and establish intersubjective ones.
For Arendt, the human condition implies a will to narrate and engage narratives.
However, the means of narration are not universally available. Not all stories are
remembered, not all stories hold equal meaning, and not all stories appear “true.” All
three of these variables fluctuate with changing social conditions, itself subject to natality
and mortality. The audience or spectators and their willingness to recollect, ruminate, and
reinterpret action, so that it may become history, constitute the means of narration:
For a true story to become a recounted story, two related events must
occur. First there needs to be an in-between that leads the way to memory
and testimony. Second, the type of narrative must be determined by an inbetween that provides the logic of memorization as a means of detachment
from lived experience ex post facto. Only when both conditions occur can
the “happening” be turned into “shared thought” through the articulation
of a “plot.”16
Through these conditions, power enters into the play of narrative. Not only must the
storyteller have the power to enter their story before the spectators with significance, but
also to reject and defend against other narratives that claim to represent the entire
intersubjective collectivity. The storyteller must have a sense of agency to tell the story,
15
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while the audience must sense the storyteller’s agency in order to act as an in-between. It
is this sense of agency, the mutual recognition that the individual oscillates between actor
and acted upon, that distinguishes those who belong to the community from superfluous
humanity.
For Arendt, agency is both crucial to her understanding of politics and inseparable
from the categories of praxis and poiēsis. Recalling earlier distinctions between labor,
action, and work, Arendt insists that intersubjective agency follows similar limitations
that separate politics from work and labor. Agency is the ability to bring one’s subjective
experience into the acknowledged order and having one’s subjective experience
recognized as able to change the order. Like politics, agency is not a means to an end. It
is not the ability to remake the order in accordance with preconceived notions,
independent from the lived experiences of others.
The notion of agency as the overcoming of other subjectivities is contingent on an
understanding politics as poiēsis or productive. In this case, instead of constantly cyclical
politics, action is reified into a single order, which statically represents the polity. With
this static representation, agency becomes understood as achieving an end through the
determinable order. Enforcing this stasis requires the objectification of members of the
collectivity. As Jackson concludes, this objectification must occur through violence:
Though violence may or may not entail physical harm, we may conclude
that a person’s humanity is violated whenever his or her status as a subject
is reduced against his or her will to mere objectivity, for this implies that
he or she no longer exists in any active social relationship to others, but
solely in a passive relationship to himself or herself (Sartre’s en-soi), on
the margins of the public realm. For this reason it may not matter whether
a person is made an object of compassion, of abuse, of attack, or of care
and concern; all such modalities imply the nullification of the being of the
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other as one whose words and action have no place in the life of the
collectivity.17
Through its objectivizing properties, violence and stasis entail one another. Violence
allows one to speak for others, thus edifying their order and their narratives, and
subverting the constants of change and plurality implied by mortality and natality.
Arendt’s conception of violence is not as the damage done to the individual, but the
destruction of, “the fields of interrelationship that constitute their lifeworlds,” which
allow for individuals to monopolize the means of narration.18

2.3 Orientalism
Edward Said’s masterpiece, Orientalism, describes how through historical and
contemporary processes of European and American imperialism, colonial forces created a
worldview that spoke for the world. The array of colonial military, political, and
intellectual institutions posited a figure of the Orient, which claimed to represent the
colonized peoples, lands, and culture, but fully independent from them. Thus, “because of
Orientalism the Orient was not (and is not) a free subject of thought or action.”19 Through
the inherently violent processes needed for objectification, the colonial polities, “gained
in strength and identity by setting itself off against the Orient as a sort of surrogate and
even underground self.”20 The colonizer knew the colonized as an externalized aspect of
themselves, negating the need for any interaction with the colonized subject, and shoring
up their own identity.
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Reading Orientalism within the confines of Arendt limits the critical weight and
analytical tools Said offers the reader. However, Said’s many kaleidoscopic definitions
and presentations of Orientalism present both insight and liability. To describe the variety
of processes and products of Orientalism meaningfully, Said employs a broad range of
description. Those who seek to use the near-canonical text for their own study often
become tangled up in the multiplicity of Orientalism, producing reflection or studies that
lack any real bite. Instead, I propose to briefly read the text through Arendt’s framework
to highlight both theoreticians’ analysis of the structural adjustment of narrative through
violence and power.
In this view, Orientalism serves as the corresponding narrative practice to colonial
conquest, which justifies past and future objectification by rendering the colonized
peoples, history, and civilizations superfluous to the action and identity of the colonizer.
The colonizer does not relate to the Orient directly, but through, “learned grids and codes
provided by the Orientalist.”21 Accordingly, the intersubjective relationship between the
occident and orient is simply the superimposition of Western ideas, beliefs, notions of
self, and fear onto the orient. The western can then interact with, discover, repress, reject,
praise, and be seduced by their own displaced reifications. Within the world imagined
through the orientalist grid, truth, for Arendt the product of intersubjective praxis,
“becomes a function of learned judgment, not of the material itself, which in time seems
to owe even its existence to the Orientalist.”22 Subsequently, the Orientalist gives the
Orient its veracity and intelligibility, depriving the Orient of the ability to do so in its own
right.
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The Orientalist project, coterminous with violent European territorial expansion,
operates by monopolizing the means of narration and employing them for the purposes of
continuing that expansion and perpetuating the ideology that drives it. Of course, as
Arendt writes, there is always conflict between the self and others. Orientalism does not
reconcile this conflict, but subverts it, preventing the dialectic friction that could lead to a
new paradigm outside of endless European domination. As Said writes:
This whole didactic process is neither difficult to understand nor difficult
to explain. One ought again to remember that all cultures impose
corrections upon raw reality, changing it from free-floating objects into
units of knowledge. The problem is not that conversion takes
place…cultures have always been inclined to impose complete
transformations on other cultures, receiving them not as they are but as,
for the benefit of the receiver, they ought to be. To the Westerner,
however, the Oriental was always like some aspect of the West…the
Orientalist makes it his work to be always converting the Orient from
something into something else: he does this for himself, for the sake of his
culture, and in some cases for what he believes is the sake of the Oriental.
This process of conversion is a disciplined one: it is taught, it has its own
societies, periodicals, traditions, vocabularies, rhetoric, all in basic ways
connected to and supplied by the prevailing cultural and political norms of
the West.23
Orientalism objectifies the culturally different subject and represents them as the
expatriated object of the westerner’s own worldview. As a result, this brash stasis allows
for the colonial forces to engage in projects. The colonizer subjects the globe to their
collective enterprise, treating the totality of the world as a means to a teleological end.
Accordingly, colonial exploits often failed to demonstrate substantial economic or social
reason, instead they appeared to the metropole as projects to realize colonial fantasies.

2.4 Pariah and Parvenu
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Arendt and Said similarly engage European imperial project. For Arendt,
European imperialism forged the way for political practices that would evolve into
totalitarianism, whose rejection and prevention became the impetus for her philosophy.
As Jackson footnotes in his work on Arendtian storytelling, her understanding of the Jew
as a pariah resembles the conclusions Franz Fanon draws on the consciousness of the
colonized in Black Skin, White Masks. Like Said, who ignites post-colonial theory by
demonstrating the lacunar absence of the colonized, Arendt chose to emphasize the
effects of antisemitism that obliterate the Jew to themselves. She writes that the “greatest
injury which society can and does inflict is to make [the pariah] doubt the reality and
validity of his own existence, to reduce him in his own eyes to the status of a
nonentity.”24 This observation persists through The Origins of Totalitarianism, in which
Arendt begins with a modern anthropological analysis of the Jewish people in Europe.
She details the frustration and failure of always and everywhere being either a pariah,
outcast and excluded from the community, or a parvenu, the obscure newcomer who
lacks the historical weight to justify their wealth or wellbeing.
The presence of the Jew as pariah begins with the secularization of Judaism. As
Kristeva summarizes, “Arendt asserts that the secularization of ‘Judaism’ into
‘Jewishness’ entails abandoning ‘identity’ (‘to be’) in favor of ‘belonging’ (‘to
belong’).25 For Arendt, this operates as a paradox. The Jew abandons their politics, belief,
and notions of truth and centrality in order to belong to the gentile community. The
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greater political community subsequently rejects the Jew for dismissing their constitutive
characteristics, suspicious that the Jew lacks the integrity to maintain any type of “being.”
Through this paradox Arendt presents her famous argument that, with modernity, many
lack “the right to have rights.” As Seyla Benhabib writes, Arendt’s statement is less
tautological than it appears. The first use of rights “is a moral claim to membership and a
certain form of treatment compatible with the claim to membership.”26 Within Arendt’s
systematic philosophy, this might be better understood as belonging or as liberation from
objectification. Arendt’s second use of the word “rights” depends upon the prior claim of
membership. To have this right “meant that ‘I have a claim to do or not do A, and you
have an obligation not to hinder me from doing or not doing A.’ Rights claims entitle
persons to engage or not in a course of action, and such entitlements create reciprocal
obligations.”27 This claim implicates three entities with tripartite responsibility for
upholding these claims: those entitled to the rights, those whose obligation to protect
these rights creates a duty, and the organization, institution or legal organ responsible for
arbitration and enforcement. Instead of the American notion of inalienable rights
endowed by higher powers, Arendt’s secular age show that these rights, integral for the
type of equality necessary for political action, presuppose a series of rights that include
place and political belonging.
The European Jew, provided the legal freedoms offered by Napoleonic law,
lacked the right to belong these freedoms presupposed. However, this mode of Jewish
suffering is not the immemorial condition of European Jews, but a product of modern the
nation-state. In the same work, she shows how, “for structural reasons, the nation state
26
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produces mass numbers of refugees and must produce them in order to maintain the
homogeneity of the nation it seeks to represent, in other words, to support the nationalism
of the nation-state.”28 The social and psychological predicaments of those trapped
between the labels of pariah and parvenu extend to refugees and all those cleansed from
nationalist homogeneity. For Arendt, the Jew is the representative of these people, with a
history of its own, but a suffering and story archetypical of this modern phenomena.
Through this framework, Jewishness develops an affinity with other dislocated
and distinguished people. Judith Butler defines this as, “a mode of living in which
alternity is constitutive of who one is.”29 From this understanding, the Jew can never
understand or give an account of oneself independent from their relation to others. For
Arendt, this mode of living is deeply engaged in her understanding of religion, love, and
politics in the world, which was tested and contested by notions of belonging. After the
publication of her work Eichmann in Jerusalem, much of world Jewry rejected her,
finding the piece traitorous. One such Jew was Gershom Scholem, who accused her of
lacking Ahabath Israel (love of the Jewish people). Arendt’s response is telling:
I found it puzzling that you should write “I regard you wholly as a
daughter of our people, and in no other way.” The truth is I have never
pretended to be anything else or to be in any way other than I am, and I
have never even felt tempted in that direction…You are quite right – I am
not moved by any “love” of this sort, and for two reasons: I have never in
my life “loved” any people or collective – neither the German people, nor
the French, nor the American, nor the working class or anything of that
sort. I indeed love “only” my friends and the only kind of love I know of
and believe in is the love of persons. Secondly, this “love of the Jews”
would appear to me, since I am myself Jewish, as something rather
suspect. I cannot love myself or anything which I know is part and parcel
of my own person. To clarify this, let me tell you of a conversation I had
with a prominent political personality who was defending the – in my
28
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opinion disastrous – nonseperation of religion and state in Israel. What he
said – I am not sure of the exact words anymore – ran something like this:
“You will understand that, as a Socialist, I, of course, do not believe in
God; I believe in the Jewish people.” I found this a shocking statement
and, being shocked, I did not reply at the time. But I could have answered:
The greatness of this people was once that it believed in God, and believed
in Him in such a way that its trust and love toward Him was greater than
its fear. And now this people believed only in itself? What good can come
out of that? – Well, in this sense I do not “love” the Jews, nor do I
“believe in them; I merely belong to them as a matter of course, beyond
dispute or argument.30
At it’s simplest, Arendt responds to Sholem by claiming that her right to belong to the
Jewish people is not produced by her behavior, but by natality. This point, however, leads
to a nuanced critique of liberation projects within an intersubjective world. Israel sought
to liberate the Jewish people from the pariah/parvenu bondage in Europe. To liberate a
people, one must delineate the people. Thus, for Arendt, when one asks someone to
engage in a project of liberation, what they are really asking is for them to exchange their
current chains for new ones.
From this, Arendt rejects this form of love for a people alienated from the
plurality of persons that constitute the grouping. To accept this love would equate to
relenting to the homogenizing agenda of the nation-state, the same agenda that plagued
modern Jewry from the beginning:
She is suggesting that our efficacy and the true exercise of our freedom
does not follow from our individual personhood, but rather from social
conditions such as place and political belonging. This is not a matter of
finding the human dignity within each person, but of understanding the
human as a social being, as one who requires place and community in
order to be free, to exercise freedom of thought as opinion, to exercise
political action that is efficacious.31
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By absolutely rejecting the site of freedom, and love, as within oneself, Arendt creates an
argument against nationalism and ethnocentrism. Instead, she locates her love within the
pursuit of her ideals and their reconciliation with a constantly changing society. It is not
the “survival” of the Jewish people that makes them great, it is the overcoming of fear
and suffering in pursuit of their sacred ideals which Arendt praises. At the cost of not
belonging, Jews have held values that have made them pariahs. Her criticism of internal
love is, therefore, criticism of belonging in a manner that is static. As she concludes in
her analysis of imperialism, “our political life rests on the assumption that we can
produce equality through organization, because man can act in and change and build a
common world, together with his equals and only with his equals.”32 Freedom and the
quest for a meaningful political equality come through motion, action, and the desire to
belong despite its impossibility in human diversity.

2.5 Universalism
In her analysis of the pariah and parvenu, Arendt uncovers another paradox:
humanity has a fundamental need to belong while, simultaneously, that belonging is
produced through our relationship to others, and the individuals that constitute those
others are always changing, preventing belonging from being full or permanent.
However, Arendt maintains throughout her life that every human holds the universal right
to belong. This right of belonging is inevitably connected to a place. Arendt’s universal
right to belonging, differs from universalism. Everyone has the right to political
belonging somewhere, but no one has the right to political belonging everywhere.
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Judith Butler frames this interpretation through William Connolly’s term
pluralization, which invokes the motion and cyclicality Arendt demands beyond the term
plurality. The commitment to pluralization entails, not only the protection of differences,
freedoms, and identities, but also a commitment to future versions that have not yet come
into existence and the judicious revaluation of past versions that have lost legitimacy and
stand only on the ground of orthodoxy. Using this concept, Butler claims:
The distinction between pluralization and universalization is importaint for
thinking about unchosen cohabitation. Equal protection or, indeed,
equality, is not a principle that homogenizes those to whom it applies;
rather, the commitment to equality is a commitment to the processes of
differentiation itself…But there is always a redoubling here that dislocates
the claim from any specific community: everyone has the right of
belonging. And this means there is a universalizing and a differentiating
that takes place at once and without contradiction – and that this is the
structure of pluralization. In other words, political rights are separated
from the social ontology upon which they depend; political rights
universalize, although they do so always in the context of a differentiated
(and continually differentiating) population.
Butler is hasty to claim that universalization and differentiation exist without
contradiction. These actions both entail many practices and potentialities that can
contradict and incite moral panic within the community. Arendt does not deny this
contradiction, but instead determines that politics serve as the catalytic agent to overcome
the contradictions.
Putting plurality into motion also avoids the traps of capitalism’s pristine
universalism. As opposed to political action, commodification can also operate as a
catalytic agent between universalization and differentiation. As a world system,
capitalism functions for the endless accumulation of capital through the exchange of
commodities, capital, and labor-power. Within capitalism, universalism operates to
facilitate smooth exchange. As Immanuel Wallerstein argues, “by a sort of impeccable
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logic, particularisms of any kind whatsoever are said to be incompatible with the logic of
a capitalist system, or at least an obstacle to its optimal operation.”33 Thus, capitalism
implements a universalist meritocracy in which labor and goods hold different values, but
are made of the same medium: capital. While Arendt demonstrates the philosophical
failures of this notion, Wallerstein turns to the historical:
Racism operationally has taken the form of what might called the
‘ethnicization’ of the work force, by which I mean that at all times there
has existed an occupational-reward hierarchy that has tended to be
correlated with some so-called social criteria…Racism has always
combined claims based on continuity with the past (genetic and/or social)
with a present-oriented flexibility in defining the exact boundaries of these
reified entities we call races or ethno-national-religious groupings.34

Therefore, within capitalism, the contradictions between universalism and racism are
reconciled through processes of making and remaking hierarchies. The universalist
tendency functions to ensure the hierarchy can include all peoples, but presumes no equal
relationship between them. “Society,” management, and progress cannot serve as the
basis of the reconciliation of difference and universalism.
By understanding this contradiction as the primary quandary of modernity and
politics as its only acceptable resolution, Arendt grounds the pariah/parvenu worldview in
some level of permanence. If our epoch condemns us to confrontation with difference and
we commit ourselves to a universal right to belong, on the basis that it is the only way to
ensure one’s right to belong and constitutes the basis of our experience of freedom, the
sensation of being a newcomer or feeling ostracized is inevitable. Of course, many people
train themselves to experience the world through self-referential representation, like the
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orientalist, or engage in systems that presume the world is homogeneous and produce this
sensation through labor and fetishized value, like the capitalist. However, these people
will always struggle to encounter the Jew or the refugee whose very existence
demonstrates the insufficiency of their world. With this in mind, Jewishness, as a project
of belonging, entails not only a people, but also a perspective accessible far beyond the
boundaries of the Jewish ethnicity:
It may be that the sense of belonging to this group entails taking up a
relation to the non-Jew that requires departing from a communitarian basis
for political judgment and responsibility alike. It is not that “one” (over
here) approaches the “other” (over there), but that these two modes of
existence are radically implicated in one another, for good and bad
reasons. “Here” and “there” as well as “then” and “now” become
internally complicated modalities of space and time that correspond to this
notion of cohabitation. Moreover, if Jewishness mandates this departure
from communitarian belonging, then “to belong” is to undergo a
dispossession from the category of Jewishness, a formulation as promising
as it is paradoxical. It also obligates the development of a politics that
exceeds the claims of communitarian belonging. Although Arendt herself
values the way exile can lead to action in the service of broader purposes,
here we might read dispossession as an exilic moment, one that disposes
us ethically. Paradoxically, it is only possible to struggle to alleviate the
suffering of others if I am both motivated and dispossessed by my own
suffering. It is this relation to the other that dispossesses me from any
enclosed or self-referential notion of belonging otherwise, we cannot
understand those obligations that bind us when there is no obvious mode
of belonging and where the convergence of temporalities becomes the
condition for the memory of political dispossession as well as the resolve
to bring such dispossession to a halt.35
Though a comfortable presence within alienation, a rootedness derived from ambiguity,
and a fragmented modality of time and space, the Jew challenges any self-referential
worldview. Unlike hierarchical universalism, this Jewish cosmopolitanism implicates the
other within the self. It internalizes notions of marginality, recognizing Arendt’s human
condition: any acknowledged, public order is partial and fails to represent the whole. The
35
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power of a society is the ability to maintain the most representative intersubjective space
through flexibility and constant adaptive motion. In opposition to collectivity through
homogeneity, as in the case of the nation-state, this “exilic” polity assumes that
rootedness is produced through interactions with the other. This universalism accepts an
unfulfilled and fragmentary belonging within the world as the fundamental precondition
for ethical belonging.
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Chapter 3: The Origins, Opportunities, and Liabilities of Zionist
Ideology
By and large, Zionism has become naturalized. By 2017, the once revolutionary
and contentious assumptions and historical interpretations the movement depends upon
are latent in many Jewish and global narratives of the formation of the contemporary
moment. This ideology has a place of origin, belongs to an era of thought, and reflects its
contemporary historical events. Within its own time, to Jews and non-Jews, the ideology
presented a series of opportunities and liabilities for the Jewish people and their
communities. Today, Zionism’s concerns and praises echo louder than when they first
entered the discourse. Importantly, that the original shortcomings of Zionism remain
prescient is telling. Zionism’s original positions, assumptions, and value have remained at
the center of the movement despite massive changes in its context and agenda. One of the
most remarkable things is how closely the movement has brought to life the ideology,
despite serious incentive to do otherwise. This chapter traces the causes of the Zionist
movement, beyond the myopic account relied upon until recent academic intervention,
and examines the initial articulations of the project in light of the political and socioeconomic changes within Germanic Jewish communities. After considering the origins, I
will present what I consider the major strengths and liabilities of the ideology.
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3.1 Emancipation, Anxiety, and Assimilation
Walter Laqueur begins A History of Zionism with the figure of Moses
Mendelsohn.37 Indeed, most narratives of the origins of Zionism select this as the starting
point for the Zionist corpus. Moses Mendelsohn, they claim, demonstrated to the
European Jewish elites that they could join the rest of Europe by accepting the
Enlightenment’s universal principles. Obviously, this discovery came with serious pitfalls
and tensions. The wistful youth of the Jewish community might desire entry into
European society without properly understanding the value of the Jewish tradition they
would leave behind. Additionally, once Mendelsohn demonstrated that the impasse
between Jewish and gentile communities could be overcome, Jews feared the integrity of
their community would dissipate.
Moses Mendelsohn was the product, not the producer, of European social tectonic
shifts that created an incredibly volatile atmosphere for European Jewish identity. The
implementation of enlightenment political thought produced policies of universalism that
removed many state-imposed limitations on Jews. In the terms of Arendt, the Jews were
granted “rights” without the belonging necessary to take advantage of them. Most clearly
and extensively, Napoleonic conquest emancipated Jews from local residential, economic
and social restrictions. Napoleonic law ensured freedom of religion and freedom of
worship. Once implemented, Jews could leave the ghetto, hold jobs, and enroll in
universities that historically forbade Jewish enrollment. Moses Mendelsohn became the
first Jew to publically achieve Enlightenment standards of greatness.
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The Moses Mendelsohn narrative supports the problematic idea that Jews in the
Enlightenment faced a decision between two identities: the traditional Jewish life from
before emancipation and the assimilated lifestyle that Mendelsohn represents. In
contradiction, the historical record shows that emancipation was not experienced as a
dichotomous choice between “old” and “new.” It presented Jews with a plethora of
potential new identities. Emancipation included Jews in new political, economic, and
nationalist networks. The internal Jewish dialogue and interrogation of these diverse
futures was rife with anxiety and insecurity. Historically unquestioned practices faced
rigorous scrutiny. Values, which for centuries were accepted on the basis of authority,
were forced to prove their worth from a variety of dissonant perspectives. These
problems of authority were not new, but resulted from accelerated and condensed forms
of cultural hybridity.
In the process of redrawing Jewishness, the concept of assimilation arose as a
term of evaluation for any potential mode of Jewish life. Accusations of assimilation
referred to different, and sometimes oppositional, lifestyles. As Stanislawsky writes,
“both ‘assimilation’ and ‘assimilated Jew’ became terms of opprobrium rather than of
precise meaning; an ‘assimilated Jew’ came to mean any Jew whose version of
Jewishness one did not like.”38 Just as Jews lacked a clear consensus on what it meant to
be Jewish, they also failed to explicate what was foreign and incommensurable to that
domain. Assimilation served as the great straw man for the arguments of this era. As
Gerson D. Cohen argues:
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Throughout Jewish history there have been great changes in law, in
thought, and in basic categories of expression, reflecting the need of the
Jews to adapt themselves and their way of life to new conditions. This
assimilation, or adaptation, was not the consequence of a desire to make
things easier, but the result of a need to continue to make the tradition
relevant.39
Jewish longevity is not, as commonly argued, produced by an incredible stubbornness or
fortitude against assimilation. Historically, the Jew’s durability as a minority results from
historically successful adaptation or assimilation. This chapter departs from the
perspective that Zionism, as a body of thought, must be interpreted and evaluated in its
original context: as a subgroup of Jewish assimilationist movements born from a
particularly tumultuous and anxious time in Jewish identity.

3.2 The Fin de Siécle
Zionism entails many different thinkers, influences, and agendas. Even today, it is
still a quite diverse body of thought. However, nearly all iterations of contemporary
Zionism claim some type of genealogical relationship to the thought of Theodore Herzl
and Max Nordau. As Stanislawsky profoundly displays, Herzlian Zionism’s roots lay
much deeper in the cultural and political thought of the Fin de Siécle than Jewish
theology or history. Herzl aimed for success in playwriting long before he became a
Zionist activist. Nordau’s prestige within the movement was originally borrowed, and
seriously paralleled, his work as a social critic. Both bring the style to their activism.
The end of the nineteenth-century contained a distinct and socially powerful
artistic movement. European prestige searched for new sources of fortification as it
struggled to find new areas to colonize. Victorian rationalism no longer monopolized the
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voice of social and political movements. The result was an epoch, “more concrete and
more cosmic than what came before, either searching anxiously for some sure foundation
or making do with frail imitations of the infinite.”40 European literature embraced this
cultural extremism by perpetually depicting a model of the world in which a fascinating,
but fearful reality rested underneath, “the paper-thin structure of civilization.”41 Each
thinker of this era sought to offer a way to break through the norms and consensus of
civilization and create a society rooted in this dark reality. They intended to achieve this
by investing cosmic meaning in mundane practices. Grand utopian worlds became
attainable by giving world history a push in the right direction.

3.3 Herzl, Nordau, and Jabotinsky
According to Zionist mythology, Herzl turned to Zionism because, after his
coverage of the Dreyfus affair, he recognized Zionism as the only escape from European
antisemitism. Meanwhile, his actual reporting reveals a Jewish journalist just as
unenthusiastic about Zionism as other Jews prior to 1890.42 His embrace of the ideology
grew out of his disillusionment with European cosmopolitanism. Prior to the rise in the
popularity and reputation of Zionism, Herzl belonged to the group of intellectuals and
artists that advocated for an ostensibly avant-garde cosmopolitanism. Herzl and his peers
came from bourgeois backgrounds, but presented themselves with an intentionally
aristocratic aesthetic. They believed in a pan-European culture that rejected any
restrictions or heterogeneity between national identities or communitarian ties. This
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belief arouse from a notion that humankind could be cultivated to a universal identity.
This was a cosmopolitanism of persons, not of cultures. Herzl, like many other
Enlightenment offspring, believed that in order to achieve their utopia, they needed to
elevate Oriental or primitive peoples to the cosmopolitan European culture they deemed
supreme. While his peers resented the aesthetic and drive for endless accumulation, the
mode of universalism resembled capitalism’s need for homogeneity masking larger
systems of hierarchy. While belonging was theoretically unlimited, it was also inherently
exclusionary.
In his utopian novel, Old-New land or Altneuland, Herzl displays how Zionism
attempted to redeem the ideals of this cosmopolitan movement. He claimed the Zionist
movement would build a piece of Europe in Asia. The Europe he imagined looked
nothing like the Europe he lived in. It was a Europe born exclusively of Fin de Siécle
ideals. Religion would be relegated to the private sphere. Arabs would celebrate the
arrival of the Jews because their immigration promised great technological and cultural
advances. The Zionist groups would construct a peace palace with Terence’s famous line,
“Homo sum, humani nihil a me alienum puto,” (I am human, and nothing of that which is
human is alien to me) carved over each entryway. Most importantly, the Jewish state
would rid itself of, “the worst invention of the ninetieth century, the fetish of nationstatehood.”43 Instead, the Zionist project would come to fruition through a decentralized
government with social solidarity built upon the recognition of cultural supremacy.
Herzl’s writings are characterized by a deeply humanistic intent, undermined by a deep
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ignorance of the political realities within both European Jewry and Palestine, which was
reinforced by his Orientalism.
Max Nordau developed Herzl’s presentation of the Zionist ideology by adding a
messianic historical narrative. As opposed to Herzl who believed the Zionist project was
a way for Jewish people to break into the bonds of European humanity, Nordau identified
it as a task of redeeming Europe’s world historical greatness. The Hungarian social critic
is best known for his work in degeneration theory. He contended that human progress had
become stifled by egomania and mystification. He planned European and Jewish
emancipation from degeneration by cleansing it of its religious elements. His political
direction in both European and Jewish aligns with one of the most misunderstood and
deeply problematic ideological axioms of the nineteenth and twentieth century: Social
Darwinism. “In both his pre-Zionist works and those written after he became a Zionist, he
presented a cultural and political theory that was neither liberal nor conservative, neither
radical nor reactionary, though it contained all of these sensibilities.”44 Nordau sought to
use the Zionist movement to cleanse the Jewish people of religion, which he believed to
be a fetishized artifact of the past. It would be replaced by rational practices, discerned by
science to fulfill the human needs religion historically fulfilled. Thus, through Zionism,
the Jews would lead Europe to the next stage of human evolution.
Vladimir “Ze’ev” Jabotinsky built out this secular messianism through the
rhetoric, aesthetic, and practices of militant nationalism. He identified his own political
thought as a more correct interpretation of Herzl than his traditional followers. Many
claim it is a right wing or fascist offshoot of the more palatable Zionism. Jabotinsky’s
thought and followers have been too essential to the state to not include him in an
44
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analysis of Zionism and expect the analysis to represent Zionism as it is contemporarily
and historically practiced. While Herzl clearly holds greater clout in Israeli history
textbooks, Israelis also complete compulsory service Israeli Defense Forced (IDF), which
originated and still relies upon Jabotinsky’s militant ideology. The dependence of Israel
on the “proudly cruel” thought of Jabotinsky will be address later in the thesis, as it
deserves its own investigation.
Jabotinsky’s critics are clearly right to identify incredible dissonance between his
overwhelming nationalism and Herzl’s distaste for the nation-state. This conflict needs to
reflect stages in which the state came into fruition. Herzl’s Zionism showed public
disdain for religion alongside its desire to eliminate the nation-state. This left very little
material for Jabotinsky to excavate a practical shared identity to sustain a settler colonial
mission. Meanwhile, Zionism’s material infrastructure belonged to middle-class secular,
Germanic Jews. Again displaying the meaninglessness of the accusation of assimilation,
Jabotinsky accused religious Jews of being “assimilated Jews” by virtue of their
religiousness. For Jabotinsky, the Jewish people were bound together by a dormant
nationalism, which was misunderstood by Jews and misinterpreted by Europeans as a
distinct “religion.” To limit Jewishness to a religion was a self-denying imposition by
gentile forces. Any Jewish emancipatory movement could not proceed along this
alienating imposition.

3.4 The Revaluation of Judaism
In the context of the Fin de Siécle, Zionism presented both advantages as a
political belief and serious liabilities. The advantages of Zionism are best reflected by the
most influential and misinterpreted thinker of the time: Friedrich Nietzsche. Though
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European society achieved new freedoms through emancipatory movements that installed
democratic regimes, Nietzsche argued that these movements failed to emancipate the
mind. The impetus to maintain the authority of cultural communities and traditional
identities contained and condemned freethinking. Democratic governance within the
confines of traditional authority structures deprived individuals of their capacity for
judgment and creativity. These authority structures work by training communities to
reject thought and argument outside a limited range. Thus, it functions by herding people
to reproduce outdated values. As Nietzsche writes in Beyond Good and Evil:
When the highest and strongest drives, erupting passionately, drive the
individual far beyond and above the average range of the herd conscience,
they destroy the self-confidence of the community, its belief in itself,
breaking as it were its spine: consequently it is just these drives which are
branded and vilified most. High and independent spirituality [Geistigkeit],
the will to stand alone, even reason on a grand scale are conceived to be a
danger; everything that raises the individual above the herd and causes
one’s neighbor to be afraid is called evil from now on; the equitable,
modest, adaptive, conforming mentality, the mediocrity of desires,
acquires the names and honors of morality.45

Goodness and morality become hollow achievements. They are the fetishes of authority.
For the individual, their value derives from the tautological notion that because society is
good, the practices and beliefs that reproduce it hold intrinsic value.
Nietzsche’s rejection of this misplacement of value does not grow from an
antisocial agenda, but the understanding that the individual consents to the limitations of
living in a society because social life makes the individual’s life meaningful. However,
this process occurs over constant flux, fluidity, and social change. Morality, the herding
of individuals through tradition and authority, operates by creating false notions of stasis
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and eternality in societies that are constantly moving in complex and unpredictable ways.
This illusion works so well because it hides the fact that all truths can only be
perspectival. Instead it advocates for one truth; one truth established by authority, as the
only possible result of history, which lacks verisimilitude for the individuals with
different perspectives. As a result two competing wills pervade human social
arrangements: the will to nothingness and the will to truth. The former is the will to
preserve the empty values of morality, the later to overturn them to include space for new
perspectives while keeping the old relevant and meaningful. For a society to maintain its
vitality, integrity, and inclusiveness, it must follow the will to truth to adapt through “the
revaluation of all values.”46
Zionism pursued the revaluation of Jewish history and morality. Critically,
Zionism sought to redefine Jewish presence within European society. In the first section
of The Jewish State, Herzl addresses the paradigmatic believe of Jews and non-Jews that
the Jew depended on gentile society, but never contributed to it. “Jews faithfully parrot
the word of anti-Semites: ‘we live off ‘Host-nations; and if we had no ‘Host-nation’ to
sustain us we should starve to death.’”47 This symptom is emblematic of a larger
problem. For centuries, gentiles could claim Jewish inferiority on the basis of their
Jewishness. With the rise of the Enlightenment paradigm, this argument became less
defensible. Those looking to defame the Jew continued to do so, often employing preEnlightenment trope, but altering them so they resonated within the context of postEnlightenment industrial capitalism. The Jew was unproductive while the gentile was
productive, the Jew was greedy while Christians were charitable, and the Jew was a
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displaced oriental in the midst of the Occident. Research apparatuses produced historical
evidence to ratify this accusation. Emancipation granted Jews legal freedom, but lacked
its social counterpart.
This partial inclusion resulted in, what Nordau termed, “Jewish spiritual
misery.”48 As Nordau acutely perceived, the French legally emancipated the Jew, “not
because the nations had decided to stretch their out the hand of fraternity to the Jews, but
because their intellectual leaders had accepted a certain standard, one of whose
requirements was that the emancipation of the Jew should figure in the statute book.”49
As a result of this emancipation, the Jew lost the ghetto, their universally recognized site
of Jewishness. The ghetto, often depicted as a prison, also served as a refuge. In addition,
it was the site of Jewish veradiction or truth telling.50 The ghetto was the place where
Jewish identity was defined, performed, criticized, and accepted.
With the loss of the ghetto, sites of Jewish identity disaggregated. In his address
to the First Zionist Congress, Nordau characterizes the situation of the contemporary
emancipated Jew in Western Europe:
He has abandoned his specifically Jewish character, yet the nations do not
accept him as part of their national communities. He flees from his Jewish
fellow, because anti-Semitism has taught him, too, be contemptuous of
them, but gentile compatriots repulse him as he accepts to associate with
them. He has lost his home in the ghetto yet the land of his birth is denied
as a home to him as his home. He has no ground under his feet and he has
no community to which he belongs as a fully accepted member. He cannot
count on justice from his fellow Christian countrymen as a reward for
either his character or his achievements, and still less on the basis of any
existing good feeling; he has lost connection with other Jews. Inevitably
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he feels that the world hates him and he sees no place where he can find
the warmth for which he longs and seeks.51
Nordau’s account is remarkably acute. However, he continues to scapegoat simple
antisemitism for larger social changes in the life of Jews. The emancipated Jew gained
access to new sites of self-discovery. Jews were no longer limited to producing their
identities in strictly Jewish spaces. However, they were unable to fully belong to any nonJewish space because they were Jewish. Therefore, as Nordau correctly characterized, the
emancipated Jew found only partial acceptance in a variety of places. In this atmosphere,
Jews debated how to escape the trap of their new freedoms, how to change the Jewish
identity to make it palatable to non-Jewish spaces. The first great merit of the Zionist
movement was its declaration that, “we are not dependent upon the circulation of old
values; we will produce new ones.”52

3.5 Centralization and Jewish Intersubjectivity
The second advantage of Zionism was its important desire to create new networks
of Jewish identity while the territory Jewish intersubjective needed to cover grew in size
and disaggregated. More clearly, once released from the ghetto, Jewish migration within
Europe caused enlarged diversification of the lived experience of Jews. Increasingly,
Judaism seemed like an incompetent system to address the needs of all its members, and
one that offered comparatively limited fulfillment. Meanwhile, abandoning the system
held minimal efficacy because it would not prevent Jews from being labeled “a Jew” by
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gentiles. Emancipation resulted in a huge population of Jews who rejected by historic
Jewish institutions, but did not belong in new communities.
Jewish identity needed to expand and centralize, so that Jews could maintain
various new intersectional identities created by new liberties. This is not to claim that
there was even one, all-encompassing Jewish identity. However, new freedoms of
movement, nationality, civic belonging, occupation, sexuality, and ownership broadened
and intensified Jewish subjectivity. Zionism pioneered the centralizing movement. Ahad
Ha’am’s early writings confirm that much of the appeal of Zionism came from its ability
to centralize disaggregated Jewish identities. For Ha’am, Zionism was a means to
revitalize and enable these new forms of Jewish life:
Hibbat Zion [Love of Zion] neither excludes the written word nor seeks to
modify it artificially though addition or subtraction. It stands for a Judaism
which shall have as its focal point the ideal of our nation’s unity, its
renascence, and its free development through the expression of universal
human values in the terms of its own distinctive spirit. This is the
conception of Judaism on which our education and our literature must be
based. We must revitalize the idea of the national renascence, and use
every possible means to strengthen its hold and deepen its roots, until it
becomes an organic element in Jewish consciousness and an independent
force. Only in that way, as it seems to me, can the Jewish soul be freed
from its shackles and regain contact with the broad stream of human life
without having to pay for freedom by the sacrifice of its individuality.53
Ha’am’s characterization of centralization is clearer than those of Herzl, Nordau, or
Jabotinsky. While the later focused on the merits of Jewish centralization through state
building, Ha’am maintained suspicions of the potentials of a state. Instead, Ha’am
supported the development of a physical focal point for Judaism because it would
designate a space for the reinterpretation of the Jewish tradition.
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Zionism entailed, for Ha’am and the others, the space necessary to effectively
revalue Judaism. In this formulation, the accessibility of the individual to Zion is the
same as Judaism’s vitality to the individual. For Ha’am, the centralization of global
Judaism in Israel served as a means to create an inclusive and fulfilling Judaism. Zion
was a permanent convention, with open invitation to global Jewry, to come and debate
what a meaningful Jewish life looked like from a variety of vantage points. For Herzl,
Nordau, and Jabotinsky, Zion was the studio where Jewish elites dissatisfied with their
life in Europe could sculpt a New Jew. Before launching into a critique of the later,
victorious group, it is important to stop and recognize that the Zionist appeal for
centralization was legitimate, necessary, and still remains the most advantageous aspect
of Zionism for contemporary global Jewry. Simultaneously, it has served as the medium
for one, or arguably a few, modes of Jewish life to dominate and subvert the multitude of
alternatives. The vitality centralization provided also created new networks of intraJewish hegemony. With that, it clearly becomes time to examine the liabilities of
Zionism.

3.6 Remembering and Forgetting
Zionism bares many of the same failures as nationalism. Before examining
problems more unique to Zionism, it would be useful to cover the peculiarities of
nationalist thought. In his justifiable masterpiece, Imagined Communities, Benedict
Anderson displays the deep historiographical work prerequisite for individuals to imagine
themselves as part of a nation. The nation needed a history that could account for its
communal boundaries within Euromodern conceptions of time. For this reason, Creole
colonial settlements in the Americas were the first to successfully install nationalism.
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Originally, these settlements operated as subsidiaries to European metropoles. As they
rose in power and prestige through the expansion of industry, they began to imagine their
own communities as, “parallel and compatible to those in Europe.”54 Peculiarly, instead
of demanding a larger or fairer share within their empires, they fought for independence.
Their justifications of independence were not historical arguments. The American
declaration of independence does not argue that “Americas” are a historic identity; that
this identity had any duration in time prior to 1776. Instead, their calls for revolution
grew from a, “profound feeling that a radical break with the past was occurring – a
‘blasting open of the continuum of history’”55 New Creole nations identified as
communities fundamentally new to the world. No American history existed before 1776.
The nationalist revolutionaries easily escaped the burden of upholding historical
mandates and precedents.
Nationalist revolutionaries in Europe could not rely on this explanation of their
new social formation. No Greek nationalist could hide the fact that a Greek identity
existed long before the modern, nationalist form. In Europe, nationalist movements relied
on the idea that the national consciousness was awaking from a deep slumber. Unlike the
Creole settlements that could claim their nationalism was novel, Europeans insisted theirs
came from time immemorial, but lay dormant until the right conditions occurred.
Importantly, this notion of dormant nationalism insisted that each subject, not only forget
different notions of identity, but remember enduring experiences of separation and
longing for their nation. Nationalists encoded a history of longing into works of art,
literature, and history for the masses to experience and remember this long fomenting
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desire. Zionist historical claims amalgamated the structure of both European and Creole
nationalism.

3.7 Foundational Myths
In The Returns of Zionism, Gabriel Piterberg convincingly describes the way
Zionist ideologues developed a historical narrative that would have profound effects on
Israeli identity and politics. This master narrative or, for Piterberg, the “how we got to
where we are and where we should go henceforth,”56 borrows from both the Creole and
European models of remembering and forgetting. As Raz-Krakotzkin famously argued,
Zionist ideology relies upon three intertwined historiographical alterations: the negation
of exile (shelilat ha-galut), the return to history (ha-shiva la-historia), and the return to the
land of Israeli (ha-shiva le-Eretz Yisrael).
The negation of exile works by dividing Zionism into three historical periods: the
majestic period of the biblical and classical Israelites, the period of Galut or exile in 70
CE following the Roman destruction of the second temple and the failed Bar Kokhba
revolt, and the return to the land of Israel. Zionist thought followed the concept of a
national destiny or volkgeist: the inevitable and intransferable end determined from birth.
However, instead of following the linear model of progress towards national fulfillment,
the Zionist model claims the Jew fell off the track by leaving the land of Israel. With this
model of Jewish history, the Zionist movement identified the culture and historic of the
exilic period as a perversion of the true Jewish nation. As a word, Galut carries a specific
political significance. “Golah means Diaspora, the actual circumstance in which Jew
happen to reside outside of the land of Israel. Galut signifies something that is
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meaningful both literally and figuratively: it is exile as an experience, as a material
circumstance, as an existential state of being, as consciousness.”57 The Zionist project
emphasized the need to quarantine Galut to the period of exile. Any public appearance or
encouragement of the exilic Jew within the land of Israel threatened the purity of the
movement.
The Zionist division of Jewish history into three parts also periodized Jewish
historical efficacy. A teleological rationality drives this periodization. During the genesis
of Zionism, historians widely accepted that the nation was the quintessential form of
human collectivity. Perhaps peoples became dispersed or misdirected on the way, but
they irreducibly belonged in these immemorial groupings. Thus, the nation was the
historical subject. Human history was the movement and development of nations towards
great civilizational achievements. To continue along this path, the nation needed to grow
from the language and the land of its origins, which the Jews disbanded long ago. BenGurion evoked this narrative in reaction to the 1917 Balfour Declaration:
Since our last national disaster, the suppression of the Bar Kokhba revolt,
we’ve had ‘histories’ of persecutions, of judicial discrimination, inquisition
and pogroms; of devotion and martyrdom; of Jewish scholars and
personalities, but we haven’t yet had Jewish history; because a history of a
people is only that which the people creates as one whole, as a national
unit, and not what happens to individuals or groups within the people. We
have been extricated from world history, which consists in the annals of
peoples.58
Ben-Gurion reprises Johann Gottfried Herder’s understanding of the Jewish people. The
historical suffering of the Jew throughout European history resulted from their
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geographical alienation from Israel. Jews suffered because they were foreigners.59 They
were an Asiatic people attempting to establish a community in Europe. The JewishEuropean project could never gain traction; with this concept of history, diasporic
Judaism was a naïve and foolhardy project. Amos Oz, the face of liberal Zionism,
presented the same argument nearly seventy-five years later, at Berkeley:

Now, my point is that in all exiles, including America, Jewish culture is
essentially in danger of becoming a museum where the only proposition
that parents can make to their children is, Please do not assimilate…The
other option…is live drama. And live drama is no rose garden, nor is it
ever pure. It is a perpetual struggle; sound and fury. Sometimes even
bloodshed. But Israel is the only place in the Jewish world now, where
there is a live drama on a large scale at work.60
Oz separates Jewish life into two forms: live drama or preserved object. The diaspora, in
contemporary time or its nearly two thousand-year history, is synonymous with stasis,
reproduction, the primitive social goal of survive. Israel, and its return to live drama,
yields the opportunity for creative production, flourishing, and motion.
The diasporic Jew finds its counterpart in the land of Israel. While the nations
lived a wayward existence in its separation from the land, the absence of the Jews
corrupted the land itself. This relationship was articulated in the famous Zionist slogan,
“a people without a land to a land without a people.” Early Zionists clearly knew that
Arabs resided in the land. The slogan claimed that Palestine was devoid of any historic
potential – any people that mattered. Just as the Jews would return to the land, the land
would return to it. Zionist and Israeli culture emphasizes performances of this reunion.
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These cultural productions and self-fashionings of reunion were demonstrations of a
new Jewish potential for historic action.

3.8 Internal Otherness
For millennia, the Jew functioned as a living synonym for the imaginary “other.”
The great thinkers of European civilization regularly deployed the image of the Jew to
identify what was wrong with the present society.61 Thus, the Jew delineated that of the
“self” that needed to be rejected or in some way did not belong. Clearly, the figure of the
Jew was not simply rhetorical. Attacks on Jews and the objects of their identity cropped
up throughout European history. These attacks borrowed the same frame. The Jew was
“the other,” toxically located at the heart of the self.
With the rise of nationalism, Jew-hatred took a new form. As Anderson notes, the
nation was conceived as a community delineated by language. Languages are relatively
easily acquirable and problematic because one individual can belong to many linguistic
communities at the same time. While the nationalist model of community offers powerful
understandings of communal continuity, it cannot provide the tools necessary to express
hatred and stigma. Historically, these use platforms that operate akin to class and, like the
aristocrats of feudalism, are only valid within the boundries of the nation:
The fact of the matter is that nationalism dreams of historical destinies,
while racism dreams of eternal contaminations, transmitted from the
origins of time through an endless sequence of loathsome copulations:
outside history. Niggers are, thanks to the invisible tar-brush, forever
niggers; Jews, the seed of Abraham, forever Jews, no matter what
passports they carry or languages they speak or read. (Thus for the Nazi,
the Jewish German was always an imposter.) The dreams of racism
actually have their origins in the ideologies of class, rather than in those of
nation: above all in claims to divinity among rulers and to ‘blue’ or
‘white’ blood and ‘breeding’ among aristocracies. No surprise…that, on
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the whole, racism and anti-Semitism manifest themselves, not across
national boundaries, but within them. In other words, they justify not so
much foreign wars as domestic repression and domination.62
Just as class systems varied across the European continent, so did Jew-hatred. More
importantly, the pseudo-scientific projects of the ninetieth and twentieth century held
little precedent and limited durability.
The Zionists accepted that while the language delineated the official community,
superseded versions of class held an eternal position as the mode hegemonic groups used
to articulate grievances. In fact, they did not only “accept” this contradiction. They
preserved it as the raison d'etre of the Zionist movement. Zionists agreed that
antisemitism existed eternally, as an immemorial and unending condition of history that
existed outside of human assembly, as opposed to being produced and reproduced within
it. Even while advocating that the Jew disavow any religious or cultural marker, Herzl
saw European disdain for the Jew inescapable:
Though perhaps we could succeed in vanishing without a trace into the
surrounding peoples if they would let us be for just two generations. But
they will not let us be. After brief periods of toleration their hostility
erupts again and again. When we prosper, it seems to be unbearably
irritating, for the world has many centuries been accustomed to regarding
us as the most degraded of the poor. Thus out of ignorance or ill they have
failed to observe that prosperity weakens us as Jews and wipes away our
differences. Only pressure drives us back to our own; only hostility stamps
us forever again as strangers. Thus we are now, and shall remain, whether
we would or not, a group of unmistakable cohesiveness. We are one
people – our enemies have made us one whether we will or not, as has
repeatedly happened in history. Affliction binds us together, and thus
united we suddenly discover our strength. Yes, we are strong enough to
form a State, and, indeed, a model State.63
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As Herzl wrote these words, Jews held little consensus about what it meant to be Jewish.
However, experiences or stories of discrimination and prejudice brought them together to
reinterpret this tradition and history. Instead of positing an answer, Zionism grounded its
argument upon the reason for coming together in the first place. Beyond the acceptance
of Eternal antisemitism, Zionism accepted an intensely European identity.
With the rise of European imperialism, the figure of the Jew, the internal Other,
became a metric of global otherness. “A construction of Jew, quite unrelated to any
objective feature pertaining to the Jews of the time, was used throughout the world as a
means of explicating unknown or little-known peoples of wildly differing
characteristics.”64 The Jew became a catalytic agent deployed to understand the
relationship between the Orient and the Occident. Thus, the Jew sat insecurely between
the sides of the paradigmatic dichotomy. The Zionist movement sought to resolve this
ambiguity and the insecurity it entailed:

While modern Jewish discourse produced expressions of ambivalence and
resistance, Zionism was based on the explicit denial of that ambivalence.
Despite the Zionist rejection of “assimilationist trends,” it can be read as
an extreme expression of the desire to assimilate the Jews into the Western
narrative of enlightenment and redemption. The condemnation of
assimilation was, in fact, the rejection of ambiguity and “in betweenness.”
Generally, Zionist thought, in spite of very important differences from
assimilationist ideologies, did not challenge the dichotomy between
Europe and the Orient; rather, it was based on the desire to assimilate into
the West. The process of Jewish colonization embodied the perspective of
both the colonized and the colonizer, by transforming the colonized and
assimilating the perspective of the colonizer.”65
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The Zionist understanding of the return to Israel as the return to the Orient is a strikingly
odd notion. The Jew could only become Occidental by returning to the Orient. The
Zionist solution to their uncertain, globalizing world was to invert a long Jewish history
as the internal Other by embracing its reciprocal: the external Self. The Jewish People
would become an oasis of the Occident within the Oriental. Prime Minister Ehud Barak
famously phrased this as a “villa in the Jungle.” This mentality pervaded Zionist
ambitions at the onset of the ideology and Israeli dreams of securitization today.

3.9 Two New Men
The Zionist project suffers from a binding dual identity. Israel, from its founding,
conceived of itself as both a liberal and ethnocratic state. These projects coexist within
different government institutions and civil spheres until they are brought into conflict
through a moment of exceptional crisis. More often than not, both sides return to
equilibrium as quickly as possible, and develop an explanation satisfactory to their
overall narrative of Jewish identity. The fact that this contradiction does not generate
serious impasses or loom with the weight of catastrophe illuminates the larger
shortcomings of the Zionist state.
Throughout the history of Israel, ethnocracy has been the prerequisite for
democracy. This logic draws its justification through the conditions of a settler colony.
As the narrative goes, obviously Israel should be a democracy like all the other
enlightened nations. However, unlike other Western nations, Israel held the unfortunate
difficulty of residing in the midst of the irrational, threatening Orient. The politics and
rhetoric rooted in the notion of “being surrounded” ignores the reality that Israel is a binational state: the state has always consisted of Jewish immigrants and indigenous Arabs.
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While the relationship between the Jewish state and the Palestinians has held democratic
elements, Israel clearly maintains resolute support for a Jewish public. The issues this
situation presents, ethnic cleaning and discrimination, will be addressed later. Here, the
contradiction is useful to highlight unresolved tensions within the Zionist movement that
both increase latent dangers and highlight the difficulties and inconsistencies of Zionist
critiques.
Within the foundational debates of Zionism, the “ends” of the project were always
a site of dispute. While Zionism was promoted as necessary movement, debates raged
about what the movement was for. The major figures of the movement fell into two
camps. The first, home to cultural Zionists, socialist Zionists, and liberal Zionists who
found Fin de Siécle unappealing, viewed the foundation of a Jewish state as a means to
liberate themselves from the ghetto and achieve the freedoms of their non-Jewish
countrymen. The later believed the foundation of a Jewish state belonged to a process of
civilizational flourishing. As Jabotinsky addressed an audience at the founding of the
New Zionist Organization:
Nor is the Jewish state the final goal. The Jewish state is but a first step in
the process of the fulfillment of High Zionism. It will be followed by the
second stage: the return of the nation to Zion, the exodus from exile, the
answer to the Jewish question. And the true final goal of High Zionism
will appear only in the third stage – the thing for which, in fact, the great
nations exist: the creation of a national culture that will impart its
magnificence to the whole world, as is written, “For out of Zion shall go
forth the Law.”66
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Jabotinsky advocates an intensive Jewish exceptionalism. This prospect is not
particularly surprising or suspect on its own right. The issue was the way the ideology
materialized.
The Zionist movement sought to achieve reform through individuals practicing
change upon themselves. As opposed to attempting to create a magnificent national
culture through social reorganization, restructuring, and institutional improvement, the
Zionist movement identified the site of world historic change in bodily fortification and
embodied practices. The founders identified the ambiguity and abnormality of the
diaspora with two archetypes: the greedy, gluttonous bourgeois Jew of capitalism and the
thin, intellectual Jew of ghetto, strangled by tradition. Just as the return to Eretz Israel
would revitalize Judaism, the return would transform the individual Jew into the New
Jew. This “Sabra” Jew embodied the new capabilities of Jew in Zionism. He was heteromasculine, aggressive, proud, athletic, and, most importantly, a human manifestation of
the capacity for action.
The denial of exile found its home in institutions that remade Jewish bodies
through self-discipline. The individual Jew could be seen practicing Zionism through
their participation in scouting groups, paramilitaries, and gymnasium. At an influential
speech at the opening of a Jewish gymnasium in Germany, Max Nordau lectured the new
members:
We must think again of creating a Jewry of muscle. Again! For history is
our witness, that such once existed, but for long, all too long, we have
engaged in the mortification of our flesh. I am expressing myself
imprecisely. It was others who practiced the mortification on our flesh,
and with the greatest success, evidenced by the hundreds of thousands of
Jewish corpses in the ghettos, church squares, and highways of medieval
Europe…Our new muscle-Jews [Muskeljuden] have not yet matched the
heroism of our forefathers who in large numbers streamed into the
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gymnasia to take part in competitions, and pitted themselves against the
well-trained Hellenistic athletes and the powerful Nordic barbarians. But
morally the new muscle-Jew surpass the ancient Jewish circus-fighters,
who were ashamed of their Jewishness, and tried to surgically conceal the
sign of their covenants with a surgical operation, as we learn from the
outraged rabbis of the times, while the members of the Bar Kochba society
loudly and freely profess their nationality.67
For Nordau, the body is the easiest way to access and measure the place of the Jew along
their teleological history. The Sabra Jew returned to history through their reformed
bodies, but held the extra advantage of expressing their Judaism in a modern-nationalist
paradigm that their ancestors lacked. Meanwhile, the Zionist movement still missed the
defining acts of heroism documented in Hebrew mythology.
The contradictory identities of Israel as an ethnocentric state and a democratic
state are made compatible through designating different sites of each paradigm. Israeli
Arabs, non-Jewish Arab granted citizenship within the state, are clearly the victims of
some state discrimination. Unlike Israeli Jews, they are not conscribed to the military,
which is often used to denounce their loyalty to the state and removes them from a crucial
process of social solidarity. Every year, many PMs are elected to the Knesset on racist
platforms and introduce legislation to support the prejudice of their constituents. In spite
of this, they rarely achieve success beyond underfunding Arab media and education or
inciting violence from the platform the Knesset provides. The more successful platforms
of Arab oppression and Jewish ethnocentrism grow from the civic apparatus. This claim
seems outrageous until it is qualified with some history of Israeli politics. Before Israel
achieved statehood, it was a coalition of expanding agricultural settlement built on stolen
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land. The land was claimed and protected by fiercely rigorous paramilitary organizations
that removed and pacified the indigenous populations.
With the founding of the state, the disaggregated paramilitaries combined to form
a national army. Even with centralization, the military has maintained this paradigm.
Originally, the Israeli Defense Forces operated with autonomy from the democratic state.
After coming under state control in 1976, the IDF maintained an identity as parallel to the
parliament. Israeli classrooms display pictures of both the Prime Minister and the
Defense Minister. While the government operates with relatively thorough democratic
standards, the military, local paramilitaries, and national culture are the site a deeply
ethnocentric project and culture. These three areas are accepted as the areas that Noradu’s
muscular Jew, the Sabra, are performed, enacted, and embodied. Jewish ethnocentrism is
inscribed on the body of the Zionist archetype and in their mandatory participation in
Israeli military institutions: both areas outside of the control of a conventional liberal
democracy. Thus, Israel appears in many serious ways a full and flourishing democracy.
However, the Jewish nation affirms its name through embodied ethnocracy and military
violence. Later in this paper, I will explore how this dynamic can cause internal conflict
and limit one another, but also that these two sides compliment and embolden one
another.
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Chapter 4: State Founding
The period between the formulation of the Zionist project in Europe and its
fulfillment as an independent Jewish state in 1948 is understudied. In this period Zionism
was no longer articulated as a series of world historical objectives, but as tangible goals
to implement the European ideology. The Zionist community debated how these could be
attained. On one end of the spectrum, voices like Martin Buber and Hannah Arendt
sought to achieve these goals by organizing the indigenous populations, global Jewish
émigrés, and developing institutions, independent of colonial rule, that could stably
navigate power sharing and demand independence through centralized, organized
resistance. At the other end, voices like Jabotinsky and Menachem Begin sought to
implement the ideals though paramilitary violence and terror. This period was decisive in
determining whether Zionism would be realized though adapting to meet the land,
people, and places it sought to cohabitate, or by overcoming these conditions through
violent destruction and rebuilding.
By 1948, the voices that sought to build a Zionism that functioned through
militancy had not only come to dominate the discourse, but they built institutions that
edified their inextricability to Zionism, determined the requirements for belonging in
Israel, and introduced their narratives and mythologies onto the global stage, intertwining
their own domination of the Zionist project with American hegemony around the globe.
To demonstrate the way this period of implementation shaped Zionism, this section will
introduce the rise to power of the Israeli paramilitaries and their leaders. Next, it will
show how Jewish immigrants to the new state neither grew out of commitment to the
ideology, nor were allowed to bring their own culture into the state. Instead, they were
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quarantined and economically marginalized until they could present themselves through
the pristinely European principles Zionism refused to abandon. Lastly, this section
explores the way the holocaust became remembered in a way that aids and sustains this
hegemony.

4.1 From Utopia to Underground
In the 1920s, the Zionist project began to confront a deep internal divide within its
ranks. The utopian visions of Zionists living in Diaspora created a platform that was
deeply impractical for the settlers in Palestine. The settlers shared the land with two other
forces: the British colonial administration and the indigenous Arab population. The
settlers, internally administered by the Yishuv, perceived these two groups as distinct
obstacles. They perceived the British as calculating, experienced, and heartless, while
writing off the Palestinians as empty fanatics. The settlers entered with, and perpetuated
at each turn, the belief that the indigenous peoples could never articulate a platform for
independence of sovereignty acceptable to global discourse. With historically astounding
ignorance of the cosmopolitan flourishing in nearby Cairo and Alexandria and the
nationalist affluence of Damascus, the settlers believed their Arab opponents to be
religious fanatics whose power was limited to the efficacy of mob mentality.68
David Ben-Gurion changed his position on how to deal with the Arab population
drastically between the early twentieth century and the independence of the state in 1948.
In a 1918 article Ben-Gurion proclaimed that, “even if the Jews were given the right to
evict the Arabs they would not make use of it.”69 Instead, the settlers needed to find a
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way into the hearts of the Arabs and work towards mutual engagement and coexistence.
Thirty years later, Ben-Gurion would oversee and publically affirm the ethnic cleansing
of the Arabs from Palestine. In the thirty years between, the Zionist ideologies
synchronized with settler practices. Zionists in Israel developed paramilitary
organizations and a militant ethos that the Bourgeois ideologues of the Diaspora and the
leftist groups in the Yishuv found abhorrent. As Ben-Gurion exemplifies, these
developments were accepted, internalized, and espoused as the core of the Zionist project
during and after the creation of the Israeli state.
Jabotinsky initiated the movement toward synchrony. He broke with traditional
Zionism, which claimed had been “watered down.”70 Instead, he advocated what he
termed as Zionist monism and others call revisionist Zionism. He disdained thinkers like
Martin Buber who, he claimed, “regard Zionism as a dream that is desirable for it to
remain a dream, never become a reality.”71 Jabotinsky undertook the task of developing
the forcefulness of Zionism. He reinterpreted the work of Herzl and Nordau to produce a
nationalistic and militaristic aesthetic akin to those of early 1900s Italy, which he became
enamored with while serving as a foreign correspondent. He perceived this
reinterpretation as being both the truest to Herzl and Nordau, but necessarily monistic.
Jabotinsky defined “monism” as the unification and purity of the Zionist movement. In
his words, this version, “does not tolerate any ideological sha’atnez.”72 Jabotinsky uses
shatnez, the Jewish taboo on weaving fabric from both linen and wool, to condemn the
intermixing of any type of social reform with the Zionist project. More explicitly, he
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argued that the success of the Zionist project derived from the individual settler’s ability
to subvert all other aspects of their identity to a unified identity as a Zionist pioneer:
The essence of the movement which is crystallizing itself laboriously within Berit
Trumpeldor, lies in its ideological monism. The majority of its members, if they
will be admitted to Palestine, will also serve as workers. They know it, are proud
of it, and are ready for it. But they are also ready for something else – always
remember that their material function in the upbuilding dare not influence their
soul. One may be a breaker of stones or a teacher, an engineer or a policeman –
above all he remains first and foremost a pioneer.73
The pioneer is the man who unquestioningly does everything he can to build the state,
who is willing to sacrifice anything for his settlement. Monism advances the principle
that militancy and the capacity for overwhelming violence are prerequisites to any of the
other potential identities a Zionist could hold.
Jabotinsky founded Betar, an international Jewish scouting group that trained and
instructed Jews in revisionist thought. Along with Jabotinsky, many members of the
Haganah believed that the Yishuv paid too much attention to moral and ideological
concerns while they should focus on tactical planning and fortification. In 1929, after
growing tension over the expansion of Jewish settlements and competition over access to
sacred sites in Jerusalem, the Jerusalem’s Arab population rioted, killing 133 Jews, with
110 Arabs killed by both Jewish settlers and British police. Outraged by the riots,
revisionist members broke away from the Haganah to form Haganah Bet (The National
Military Organization for the Land of Israel) commonly shortened to “Irgun.” They filled
their ranks with Betar trainees smuggled in from the diaspora. Unlike any dispute the
British colonial administration encountered or suppressed, the Jews and Arabs exchanged
arson, explosive, and sniping attacks for most of the decade.
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In 1937, the British colonial forces evaluated that Arab and Jewish cohabitation of
the same land impossible. The Peel commission declared that the writers and signers of
the Mandate for Palestine, which promised the eventual creation of the Israeli state, could
not have foreseen this level of conflict between Jewish and Arab populations. The British
claimed that a single, bi-national state would be unworkable for the inhabitants and
proposed partition instead. For Zionist paramilitary leaders, the changed promise felt
outrageous and reiterated their belief that a Jewish state could only be liberated through
force. In July of 1937, in Alexandria, Jabotinsky returned from his work in the diaspora
to meet with Irgun commanders Bitker and Rosenberg. Though initially hesitant about
accepting a policy of indiscriminant retaliation, the commander explained the
impossibility of achieving liberation if they limited operations to the guilty.74 Once
Jabotinsky accepted, the Irgun received the carte blanche they needed to develop into an
incredibly effective terrorist organization.
Initially, orthodox groups and international Zionist agencies expressed outrage at
the decision to abandon the principle of havlagah: absention from retaliation against the
innocent. Their indignation resonated with some moderates in the revisionist and Irgun
bases. Any dismay over indiscriminate killing ended with the execution of Shlomo BenYosef. Ben-Yosef joined two other members of the Irgun to plan a “revenge attack” on a
busload of Arab citizens traveling along the Tiberias-Rosh Pina road. The plan relied
upon a grenade that turned out to be a dud. When captured, the British colonial
authorities decided to make an example out of him. While his companions were released,
Ben-Yosef was sentenced to hang by the neck until death. On June 29th, the day of his
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hanging, Ben-Yosef walked towards the gallows singing Shir Betar, the anthem of Betar
written by Jabotinsky himself:
Betar
From the pit of decay and dust
With blood and sweat
Shall arise a race
Proud generous and cruel
Captured Betar, Yodefet, Masada
Shall arise again
In all their stregnth and glory
As they fixed the noose around his neck, Ben-Yosef shouted the anthem of Betar, “long
live the Jewish state! Long live Jabotinsky!” He became the Martyr of the Irgun. The
mythology developed around the symbolic death of Ben-Yosef hollowed out the
moderate Irgun and heightened the sympathies of those outside of the organization.75
The following year was shockingly bloody. The quantity and brutality of the year
illustrates the newfound effectiveness of the Irgun. Over 1,500 Arabs were killed while
only 292 Jews died.76 Even with this success, The Irgun began internal meetings to
evaluate continuing their attacks. The British faced war with Nazi Germany, who
declared themselves the foe of the Jew. The Irgun needed to choose between acting in the
name of Jews or acting in the name of Israel. The decision forced a schism in the
organization. Just as the Irgun grew out of the militant faction of the Haganah, LEHI,
Fighters for the Freedom of Israel, grew out of the Irgun. Lead by the brutal, handsome,
and brilliant Avraham Stern, LEHI was built out of distrust for the Yishuv, belief in
force, and a deep hatred of the Arabs. LEHI developed the canon of contemporary
terrorist undergrounds. The group lacked the means to operate with the fascistic grandeur
of the Irgun, but ran an effective underground, both deadly to the Arabs and humiliating
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to the British. Retrospectively shocking, but quite calculated within the moment, under
Stern’s orders LEHI conducted a failed attempt to seek an alliance with the axis party.
British authorities captured and killed Stern in 1942, only temporarily leaving LEHI
leaderless and weak.
After the Axis defeat, the British people elected the labor party to run the country
in 1945. Their anti-Imperialist platform and history signaled to the Jewish people that the
independence of Israel was imminent, that finally the Balfour declaration would be
fulfilled. It soon became quite clear that the British were not eager to withdraw.
Politicans like Ben-Gurion and Chaim Weizmann were left with little traction for their
liberal and leftist visions of a Jewish state. Peace seemed an empty promise. When the
Asian stage burned-out after Japanese surrender, the world’s press turned to Palestine.
Afraid of losing status, the Haganah began to adopt similar resistance tactics to those of
LEHI and the Irgun. They continued militant resistance tactics until the state received
official recognition and liberation. When independence was granted, the new Israeli
government attempted to incorporate all fighting factions into the newly formed Israeli
Defense Forces (IDF). Both the Irgun and LEHI agreed to incorporation. However, in the
murky transition period, the Irgun scheduled the importation of 153 million Francs worth
of arms into the port of Tel Aviv on a ship named the Altalena, after Jabotinsky’s nom de
plume. Amidst humanitarian concerns surrounding Jewish importation of weapons and
internal concerns that the state could not monopolize power, Ben-Gurion ordered that the
Irgun be prevented from receiving the supplies. With a short exchange of gunfire, the IDF
accidently set off a gun inside the ship, causing a series of explosions that sunk the boat.
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The Altalena affair was the final mission of the Irgun outside of the command of the
state.
Within this period of fragmenting paramilitaries, steadfast martyrs, and reluctant
politicians and writers making concession after concession, Zionism developed a new
paradigm of governmentality. Through the internal struggles for power within the settler
communities and external experiments in violent dispossession and subjectification, new
forms of common sense arouse from the settler population. On the right, militant groups
within Israel and throughout Europe developed and institutionalized new practices. The
Zionist could be trained in Betar scouting groups and brought to Israel to serve in any of
the three major organizations. Once in the new Jewish homeland, they accepted that their
purpose was to serve as a pioneer: a mixture of settler, solider, and policeman. On the
left, genuine ambitions to develop mutuality and a shared civic space with the indigenous
population were undermined by settler colonial conception that violence was the only
language that could communicate with the indigenous population. Socialist and antiimperial ambitions were also victims of Zionism paramilitary action. Without the strong
counterpoint to the newly emboldened right, Zionism lost much of its original ideological
difference from colonial movements. The image of the Zionist sharing the land through a
deep humanistic commitment was overwhelmed by the image of the Zionist reclaiming
the land through pioneering might and greatness.
This reformulation of governmentality also created the potential for a uniquely
amnesia-prone society. The Zionists considered their violence necessary to facilitate the
radical break in Jewish history that accompanied the “return.” Through this lens, the past
was condemned to generalization and deprived of voices of either dissent or nuance to
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make it fit the Zionist phenotype of the diasporic period. This required regular acts of
denial and forgetting on the part of the settlers. Simultaneously, the institutionalized
terrorist tactics developed during this period were built upon a rationale of vacillating
between overwhelming violence and periods of peace. This logic demands that the Israeli
subject pretend that the designated “normal” periods of peace were equivalent, in spite of
the manifold ways the violence changed things.77

4.2 The Ingathering of Exiles
After independence, many of the Jews who immigrated en masse could not fulfill
the new demands of the state. The first half of the twentieth century held horrid misery
for this long-suffering group. In Western Europe, the Nazis systematically exterminated
the Jews In the East, fervent ethno-nationalism incited pogroms, or raids and massacres
of the Jews, often supported or tolerated by the governments. In the contemporary Zionist
narrative, this half-century proved, in a nearly scientific manner, the validity of the
Zionist project. If the Jews did not have a state and a strong military, their long history
would not survive the modern era. However, as Tom Segev masterfully documents, the
Jews that immigrated to Israel did so for a variety of reasons.78 Some felt the Zionist
cause newly compelling. Many fell behind the Iron Curtain and accepted emigration as
their only route of escape. Some left for religious fulfillment. However, for most, the first
half of the century destroyed the institutions they held dear. Jewish communities seemed
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uncanny after the war. They would never hold the same meanings, mediate the same
interactions, and provide the feelings of belonging they once promised their members.
In contrast, Israel held new promise and Jewish migration seemed to lead
naturally to Tel Aviv. While many preferred to immigrate to the United States, the
majority settled for Israel. For the Zionist leadership in Israel, this lack of enthusiasm and
desperate acceptance of the Zionist program felt insulting and embarrassing. Both to
continue the rapid flow of immigrants and to verify a narrative that spoke in terms of
historical destinies, the Zionists propagated that another Holocaust or another pogrom
could arise at any moment. The Israeli embassies acknowledged that immigration and
acceptance of the Zionist ideology depended on maintaining the palpability of distress
within the Jewish community.79 Distress and fear replaced love and dedication as the
drivers of immigration to Israel.
The pre-independence Zionists needed the military and labor power of the
immigrants, but held deep spite for the Jews they needed to accept to achieve this goal.
As Knesset member Giora Yoseftal claimed, “Israel wants immigration, but the Israelis
don’t want the immigrants.”80 On one hand, every party wanted Jewish immigration to
Israel. As Israeli poet Nathan Alterman wrote:
“Its good to be a million
You look at them and your eye grows moist
Tears twinkle. Any why?
For we’ve said it, brother – statistics
Is not always something dry…”81
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The statistical growth of Jews in Israel represented the fulfillment of long Zionist desires.
It also held serious practical benefits. The Israeli government faced three urgent tasks
after the state received independence: 1) to fill the land they captured with a Jewish
majority population, 2) to grow the economy, 3) grow the force and size of the military.
Continuing mass immigration proved crucial to all three. The early years of state
development dedicated incredible funds to smuggling and negotiating the immigration of
global Jewry. Israel crafted trade deals and focused all diplomatic operations on
promoting immigration. The Israelis began buying Jews from the Eastern block: $100 for
each Bulgarian and Romanian Jew. In Hungary, the price was set at $80, then raised to
$1000, and after Israel objections that this was too expensive, not enough, and that these
Jews may be of inadequate quality, the price was lowered to $300 per Jew.82
While Israel reacted to its dire need for immigrants, the actual immigrants were
objectified and despised by the pioneers. To the disdain of those familiar with the
writings of Herzl, Nordau, and Jabotinsky, the Jews arriving on the shores of the Eretz
Israel were the Old Jews the Zionist ideologues used for contrast. The new immigrants
were the Jews the movement hoped to cleanse from history. The wave of immigrants
exposed, but did not amend, that the movement grew from internal disdain for certain
types of Jews. Indeed, the same tropes about Jews employed by the antisemites.
In 1949, Haaretz journalist Aryeh Gelblum entered Israeli migrant camps under
the name “Haim Klopstock.” In its day, his highly influential writing exposed the
treatment of the immigrants. It still achieves this with insight, but also exposes the
prejudiced lens of the early Israelis. Gelblum grouped the newcomers into three different
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categories: the elite, the second-rate, and the “African-Arabs.”83 The first tier contained
the New Jews, as imagined by Zionist ideologues, ready to join the military and labor for
their nation. The second-rate were, for Ben-Gurion, “ugly, impoverished, morally
unstable and hard to love.”84 Gelblum described the “typical new immigrant” as “a short
little Polish Jew with prominent jaws, accompanied by his little fat wife.”85 The Zionists
provided the “second-rate,” with the historical narrative of being the leftovers of the Nazi
extinction attempt. As Ben-Gurion stated, they, “were people who could not have
survived if they had not been what they were – hard, evil, and selfish people, and what
they underwent there served to destroy what good qualities they had left.”86
The category of “African-Arab” is expressed in two parallel fields. First, they held
a lack of productive utility. The Oriental Jews were described as a social and literal
plague for the Israeli peoples.87 A report from Aden concluded that the Falasha
(Ethiopian) Jews would struggle to survive in Israel because they were the product and
practitioners of intermarriage and pervaded by venereal diseases.88 Before allocating
recourses to import the Yemeni Jews, the Knesset questioned whether importing such a
sickly people was worthwhile. As Itzhak Greenbaum asked, “Can we withstand an
immigration of which 70% are sick?”89 The accusations of sickliness paralleled
indictments of spiritual infirmary and historical decrepitude. The foreign office warned
its diplomats that, “preservation of the country’s cultural level demands a flow of
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immigration from the West, and not only from the backward Levantine countries.”90
Maintaining a western society was the same as maintaining a Jewish society. The
Oriental Jews suffered from an alienation from the Jewish historical destiny a degree
greater than the European diasporic Jew. In an article in the Government Annual, BenGurion wrote that, “The ancient spirit left the Jews of the East and their role in the Jewish
nation receded or disappeared entirely. In the past few hundred years the Jews of Europe
have lead the nation, in both quantity and quality.”91 If the diasporic European Jew
contained a seed destined for germination in Zion, the seed of Oriental Jew suffered from
dormancy: they required enlightenment before they could hope to grow.
Meanwhile, the Zionist leaders were dependent on the Oriental Jews for human
capital. Zionism intended to escape bourgeois industrial capitalism by building a nation
of farm laborers. The vitality of the New Jew derived from their relationship to the land.
While some farmers and Kibbutzim emigrated from Europe, the majority either was
trained or wanted employment in urban labor. Initially, trade deals with the Eastern bloc,
which intersected with the market for immigrants, sustained a secure source of food.
However, importing food from Europe was expensive and posed an unnecessary drain on
the state and Zionist charities. In a manner Ben-Gurion explicitly compared to American
economic development through African slave labor, Israel needed the Oriental Jews for
agricultural labor.92
The denigration of Jewish immigrants to Israel demands a comparative scope. The
nation desperately needed strong workers and fighters, but received camps full of starved
Auschwitz survivors, separated families beaten by pogroms, and embodiments of cultural
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differences that needed to be bridged before they could see productivity. To differing
degrees, they would have faced anti-immigrant, anti-Semitic, and anti-Arab sentiment
regardless of their destination. The voice of Aryeh Gelblum demonstrates the extent to
which the Israelis critically engaged the immigration processes and offered the funds and
sacrifices necessary for people they had never met, but sought a better life in their
country. The extent to which the framework for immigration was constant with the period
or unique to Israel deserves further debate. However, one achievement of the mass
immigration was unique to Israel. At a local level, immigration succeeded to edify the
conclusion that Israel was necessary. Before the foundation of the state, Zionism was a
political fringe group. The narratives produced through exchanges between immigrants
and the establishment, alongside the public expenditure of material wealth in resettlement
and rescue, explained that a Zionist future was the only future for Jews in Israel. Within
twenty years, it went from an opinion to a consensus. This historical framework was
replicated at the global level through interpretation of the Second World War and the
mass murders that would come to be termed, “the Holocaust.”

4.3 Zionism and Final Solutions
After the first half of the twentieth century, Jewish objections to the Zionist
project met new limitations. While dissenters could disagree, the overwhelming
consensus within the Jewish community was that the Zionist project, and the human
sacrifices and moral concession it entailed, was necessary for the survival of the Jewish
people. Support for Zionism became an existential matter. Critique of the movement was
often approached as a dangerous psychic failure. The trope of the self-hating Jew allowed
for disagreement with the necessity of the project to be written off as a psychological
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ailment akin to a mental illness with serious potential for social harm. This astonishingly
strong social solidarity and discursive power to silence dissent and critique of the Zionist
project was attributed to the “Holocaust.” The fear and fragility of the death factories
provided a reservoir of social power. However, the actual event does not prescribe the
silencing of disagreement in its own right. The use of the historical Holocaust for the
Zionist project occurred through global processes that interpreted and fashioned the
meaning of the murder within networks of collective Jewish and non-Jewish. In other
words, Elie Weisel’s famous claim in the 1970s that the Holocaust represented an
“ontological evil” nullifies the insight of history and social science. In these fields evil is
an epistemological question: how did the Holocaust become evil?
The contemporary view of the Holocaust attaches it to a tradition of viewing
Jewish history as “an uninterrupted record of antisemitism and persecution.”93 It operates
on a global stage by allowing both Jewish and non-Jewish communities to invoke the
Holocaust symbolically within their own political discourses. As Jeffery C. Alexander
argues, this has not always been the framework, nor has this framework always held such
broad utility and consensus.94 The material capacity for this framework was chiefly
American and Nazi German. German propaganda depicted the Jew as the enemy of the
Third Reich. American propaganda depicted the Nazism as the enemy of universalism.
The American sentiment toward the Jew was constructed through the Jew’s relationship
to the Nazi. American media and politicians began portraying the Jew in a positive
manner. However, the Jews were not included on stable principles of creating an
accepting and diverse community against Germany’s racial supremacist state. Acceptance
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of the Jew was secondary to the primary goal of anti-Nazism. Instead, antisemitism,
which had long histories in American and other Western nations, became synonymous
with fascist and anti-democratic projects. Accordingly, democratic and liberal nations
necessarily became “anti-antisemitic.” For the Zionist project, this interaction held
significant political promise through its ability to bind the fates of the American and
Jewish nations. The newfound interdependence of these two identities shaped how each
could assert themselves the world order.
After the war, the Jew, the Nazi, and the American became symbolic characters
within democratic political discourse. These characters existed in two contradictory
narratives. The first “progressive narrative, “depended on keeping Nazism situated and
historical, which prevented this representation of absolute evil from being universalized
and its cultural power from being equated, in any way, shape, or form, with the power
possessed by good.”95 This narrative portrayed Nazism as anomalous. The past could
only become the present by passing through a threshold of chaos. However, this trauma
was deeply liminal. The progressive narrative stabilizes American and Israeli social order
within a narrative of interconnected progress between the two nations.
The progressive narrative is clearly exemplified by the layout and structure of
both countries Holocaust Memorials. At United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, the
visitor follows a path through chronological exhibit of the Holocaust. It begins with the
antisemitic propaganda preceding the war, continues through the capture of Jews and the
experience of the konzentrationlager, and progresses through the liberation of the camps.
Before returning, the visitor walks through a changing exhibit that details global
genocides between the Holocaust and contemporary times. Finally, the visitor resumes
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normalcy, left to contemplate the Holocaust and its continuity through global genocides
while looking over the Jefferson and Washington memorials. The visit delivers a message
of juxtaposition between two paradigms: the democratic, tolerant United States and
genocidal hatred. Genocide acts as a foil, one that is defeated over and over by the United
States, but through this contained progression, the identity, legitimacy, and social order of
the United States is reproduced and reaffirmed.
Yad Vashem follows a similar, but more brilliant and powerful, progressive
layout. The visitor begins their journey at the museum built into the side of Mount Herzl
greeted by the flourishing and vitality of Jewish life before the Holocaust. From there,
they journey through its decent. It concludes with the deeply empathetic and associative
moment where the visitor walks over piles of shoes, taken off the victims just before
gassing and cremation, for resale to fund the German empire. The shoes are illuminated
and placed under glass. The visitor watched as their own shoes move through those of the
murdered. Unlike the victims, their feet continue onward to a multimedia display of the
exhumation of mass graves. They emerge from the horror and enter exhibits that
intertwine the founding of the Israeli state and the trial of Nazi leaders. Nuremberg and
Tel Aviv attain similitude by both delivering justice to the Jewish people. Just like
Washington DC, the visitor emerges to gaze over the hills of Jerusalem. They are
delivered from the darkness of the European Holocaust directly to a promising future in
Israel.
The progressive interpretation has held incredible creative power in both Israeli
and American history. Holocaust survivors, as we have seen, were originally rejected and
despised by both states. Once the progressive narrative became a framework for the
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symbolic trauma, survivors became objects of reverence, embodying the ability to rise
out of the darkness and move beyond it. As Alexander writes:
This interpretation suggests that it was by no means simply Realpolitik
that led President Truman to champion, against his former French and
British allies, the postwar creation of Israel, the new Jewish state. The
progressive narrative demanded a future oriented renewal. Zionists argued
that the Jewish trauma could be redeemed, that the Jews could both
sanctify the victims and put the trauma behind them, only if they returned
to Jerusalem. According to the Zionist world view, if Israel were allowed
to exist, it would create a new race of confident and powerful Jewish
farmer-warriors who would redeem the anti-Jewish atrocities by
developing such an imposing military power that the massive murdering
of the Jews would never, anywhere in the world, be allowed to happen
again. In important respects, it was this convergence of progressive
narratives in relation to the war and the Jewish mass killings that led the
postwar paths of the United States and the state of Israel to become so
fundamentally intertwined. Israel would have to prosper and survive for
the redemptive telos of America’s progressive narrative to be
maintained.96
The progressive narrative created a deep and expensive interdependence between the two
nations. It provided both a historical mandate on the global stage. However, the
progressive mandate was not the only frame used to interpret the meaning of the
Holocaust.
Deeply contradictory to the movement of the progressive narrative, the Holocaust
is depicted as an inescapable manifestation of evil that the world must return to, eternally.
The progressive narrative placed the Holocaust within a historical time and it belonged to
certain people: Jews, Nazis, and Americans. The eternal-return narrative removed any
notions of historical time, politics, and social conditions. The Holocaust “came to be
understood as a unique, historically unprecedented event, as evil on a scale that had never
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occurred before.”97 As Geoffrey Hartman, the literary theorist who ran the Yale Video
Achieve for the Holocaust wrote:
The promise of academic fields is based on their promise for intelligibility.
That promise is not so readily available in this case…the scholars most
deeply involved often admit an “excess” that remains dark and frightful.
We can, of course, suspend the search for meaning by adopting a purely
descriptive approach, or point to the fact that fields are constituted by
areas that have become intelligible, and the hope that other areas will
follow suit. Yet something in the specific case of the Shoah remains dark
at the heart of the event, not just in its peripheral regions; and it leads to
reflection that seems “theological”…A comparison to the French
revolution is useful. The sequence French Revolution: Enlightenment
cannot be matched by Holocaust: Enlightenment. What should be placed
after the colon? “Eclipse of Enlightenment” or “Eclipse of God”?98
From this viewpoint, the function of the Holocaust is certainly theological. It deeply
resembles Durkheim’s sacred-evil that operates as an omnipresent reference that orders
and delineates the profane world. “In this tragic narrative of sacred-evil, the Jewish mass
killings become not an event in history but an archetype, an event out of time. As
archetype, the evil evoked an experience of trauma greater than anything that could be
defined by religion, race, class, region.”99 In this narrative, to be human is to empathize
and actively remember the Holocaust. The Holocaust situates morality and meaning for
all of mankind.
These two narratives are fundamentally contradictory. Their contradictory nature
does not operate dialectically, combatively overwhelming the other until the order breaks
and a new paradigm is realized, but complimentarily. The dual symbolic utility of the
Holocaust, as specifically American and Israeli and as a universal archetype, works to
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reproduce and edify the impunity and necessity of Israel. In the progressive narrative, the
creation of Israel is necessary to move beyond the Holocaust. History produced
antisemite after antisemite. The ability of Israel to oppress and contain the Arabs, the
newest face of antisemitism, displayed progress: for the first time, the Jews were able to
dominate the antisemite, as opposed to vise versa. On Israeli independence day, the
history of the Jewish people is summarized in the slogan “M’shoah L’tkuma” (from
Holocaust to revival). Here, the Jew wills their way out of darkness through admirable
strength. Meanwhile, the trope of the “return to the Holocaust,” depicts the Jewish people
as constantly on the brink of destruction. On the right, Menachem Begin employs this
trope throughout his speeches and writings. After visiting Yad Vashem with Sadat, Begin
recalled the Holocaust:
“No one came to save us-neither from the East nor from the West. For this
reason, we have sworn a vow, we, the generation of extermination and
rebirth: Never again will we put our children in danger, never again will
we put our women and children and those whom we have a duty to defend
– if necessary at the cost of our lives – in range of the enemy’s deadly
fire.”100
Alternatively, the leftist leader Abba Eban compared the option of a return to the 1967
borders was a return to the borders of Auschwitz.
Israel moves between the two narratives flexibly. Paradoxically, the Holocaust
belongs to the Jew, but represents all of humanity. The intersection of these two
characteristics makes dissent against Israel, for Jews, Arabs, and others, deeply
problematic. Through the narrative of eternal return, to be against the Jews is to be
against humanity. Meanwhile, through the progressive narrative, Israel and the Zionist
project represents Jews after the Second World War. Subsequently, through the
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consensus that both narratives are true, to be against Israel is to be against humanity. The
discursive power the Holocaust narrative carries globally is the final piece in the creation
of the Israeli state. At its founding, Israel was not a world power. The affairs of the
Zionist movement began as peripheral to the global Jewish community, and after it
gained clout within this world, peripheral to the worlds of global power. Though
Jabotinsky, Stern, and Begin liked to imagine themselves at the center of Britain’s
concerns, they were a small colonial issue: a problem for certain offices. Through the
reformulation of world order after the end of the Second World War, Israel succeeded in
two enduring accomplishments. First, though symbolic and discursive force, developed
interdependence with global economic and military powers. Second, within global
discourse, “anti-antisemitism,” and subsequently support of Israel, became synonymous
with the Western democratic project. Thus, no matter how illiberal the paramilitaries that
achieved Israeli independence acted or how xenophobic the new immigrants were treated,
Israel retained its status as a fetish of Western democracy.
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Chapter 5: Zionism and the Palestinians
Thus far, I have presented how Zionism developed as a fringe within debates on
Jewish identity at the end of the nineteenth century to become the major Jewish social
movement of the twentieth century. From its inception, and until the present, socialists,
conservatives, liberals, and fascists produced coherent interpretations of Zionism, but
processes of state founding variously favored and institutionalized these interpretations.
Until this section, I have abstained from exploring the most important understanding of
Zionism for any critical review: the standpoint of its victims. It was quite easy to delay
telling the story of Zionism’s victims. The perspectives of those who believe Zionism has
been a justifiable project and those who seek justice for its victims are so divergent that a
single author can rarely propose an argument satisfactory to both. In part, this justiceless
lacuna is produced by the uneven oppression of the colonizing force. As Fanon writes in
The Wretched of the Earth, colonialism begins through violence. Once it has razed the
ability of the indigenous population to resist, destroying the internal mechanisms
independently operating society, it replaces it with colonial means for prescribing justice.
While the colonizer determines their own mechanisms sufficient for discerning justice,
the colonized never entered into these consensually, and no result that come from them
can be considered just. Thus, the two, “follow the dictates of mutual exclusion: there is
no conciliation possible, one of them is superfluous.”102
Therefore, opposed to claiming an objective approach, I think it is more judicious
to attempt to understand both bodies of texts, and their subjects, with compassion and
humanity. Again, thus far this task has been relatively easy. The Zionists attempted to
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find a place in the world for one of modernity’s great victims. It its broadly accepted
nowadays that the Jew represents the classic victim of modern times. However, this
makes telling the story of the Palestinians very difficult. How does one tell the story of
the victims of the victims?103 The first option is to identify them as the ironic mistake of
the victims. Through no fault of their own, the original victims, the Jews, ended up
persecuting others through reckless or unpredictable circumstances. The simplest
summary of this perspective is taken by Isaac Deutcher, who describes Israel as a man
jumping out of a burning building and only surviving by landing on the body of another,
the Palestinians. The injury of the Palestinian is regrettable, but accidental.
The second option is to identify them as inextricable and within the redemptive
project of the victims. Certainly, one can identify examples of Palestinian oppression that
occurred through mismanagement. However, from its origins, Zionism has emphasized
explicitly the internal destruction of Arabs and Arabness. Like Fanon’s accusation that
colonialism entails mutual exclusion, Zionism has sought to make the Palestinian
superfluous in their own land. This section selects moments from this history of
colonization to illuminate the origins of the most unresolvable antagonisms in the IsraelPalestine conflict and to demonstrate that many of these were first imagined by European
Zionists to resolve the ambiguity of the Jew and brought to fruition through settler
colonial practices. First, this section reviews The Question of Palestine, in which Edward
Said recreates the Zionist encounter with the Arab. Next, it examines the contemporary
formation of the Palestinian identity and the diverse ways that being Palestinian is
experienced. Afterward, it continues by exploring the dual processes of ethnic cleansing
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and pacification that have maintained Israeli ethnocentrism and hidden the oppression of
Palestinian subjugation.

5.1 Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Victims
The early platforms for Zionism were formulated in an atmosphere that asked
whether the Jews were an occidental or oriental people. Zionism answered that Jews were
unambiguously occidental. Accordingly, alongside the project of Jewish reestablishment
and historical redemption, Zionism sought internal purification. Within Europe, the Jew
could not practice a response to accusations of Orientalness. The character of the Orient
flexibly met the characteristic the antisemite accused the Jew of embodying.104 As hard as
the Zionist in diaspora fought to prove they were not Oriental, they could not escape their
enigmatic status. Once the Jew “returned” to Israel, the Zionist rejection of the Orient
became a practical matter. Just as the occident was antithetical to the Orient, the Jew was
antithetical to the Arab. Zionists sought to negate the public appearance of anything
Arab.
The great gap in literature on Zionism is not accidental. Depending on which side
of the Occidental/Oriental dichotomy one stands on, the ideology holds completely
different meanings. Zionism’s internal disagreements, historical background, and legality
have mattered to global Jewry, world powers, and colonial Europe. Meanwhile, the lived
experience of Palestinians leaves no space for this history. As Edward Said confirms,
“what these ideas expressed to Arabs was only a rejection of Arabs. Thus, Israel itself has
tended to appear as an entirely negative entity, something constructed for no other reason
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than either to keep Arabs out or to subjugate them.”105 To Arabs, the Zionist project can
only be experienced as the chains on her feet or the drone overhead. The Arab
understands Arabness with a deeply personal perspective. It constitutes their history, their
self-understanding, the contemporary worlds they inhabit. In the Zionist imagination,
even prior to any actual interaction with living Arabs, they represent pure negation. “In
his body and being, and in the putative emotions and psychology assigned to him, the
Arab expressed whatever by definition stood outside, beyond Zionism.”106 The IsraeliArab conflict is a zero-sum game. Both sides presuppose rejecting the other.
In some respects, this paradigm operates similarly to other settler colonial
worldviews. It establishes an absolute dichotomy between colonized and colonizer and
divides the world, down two the most trivial details, on this taxonomy.107 In standard
colonial worldviews, the settlers emphasized their connection to the metropole and
viewed the land they settled as foreign, exotic, and wild. The Zionist doctrine of the
“denial of exile” and the belief in “return,” demanded that the Israeli settlers reconfigure
this worldview. As Said writes
Zionism was not only a reproduction of nineteenth-century European
colonialism, for all the community of ideas it shared with that colonialism.
Zionism aimed to create a society that could never be anything but
“native” (with minimal ties to a metropolitan center) at the same time that
it determined not to come to terms with the very natives it was replacing
with new (but essentially European) “natives.” Such a substitution was to
be absolutely economical; no slippage from Arab Palestinian to Israeli
societies would occur, and the Arabs would remain, if they did not flee,
only as docile, subservient objects. And everything that did stay to
challenge Israel was viewed not as something there, but as a sign of
something outside Israel and Zionism bent on its destruction – from the
outside. Here Zionism literally took over the typology employed by
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European culture of a fearsome Orient confronting the Occident, except
that Zionism, as an avant-garde, redemptive Occidental movement,
confronted the Orient in the Occident.108
The Zionist history of linear, Jewish progress culminating in a return to the land they
have legitimately owned since time immemorial was placed on top of a diverse
population with different histories. Unlike Zionism, colonial projects could tolerate these
narratives, as long as they recognized colonial supremacy, distinctions, and subjugations.
The linear, continuous narrative of Zionism excluded all other histories. Thus, while the
colonial project sought to control the natives of the land, Zionism sought to supplant
them, both in the present and in all historical representations.

5.2 The Palestinians
Prior to Zionist colonization, the indigenous Palestinian population lacked a
national social solidarity. Like many colonial delineations, the borders “Palestine,” drawn
by the British, seemed relatively arbitrary. Palestinians maintained acute awareness that
they inhabited a “holy land.” For centuries, Palestine was imagined through much of the
globe as the symbolic and devotional center of the world. Art, literature, and poetry
composed fantastic imaginations of sites like Bethlehem, Jerusalem, and Hebron. While
world interacted with these sites through their religious and political imaginations, the
Palestinians interacted with them in their day-to-day realities. This dissonance has always
undermined Palestinian collective claims. “Epistemologically, the name of, and of course
the very presence of bodies, in Palestine are – because Palestine carried so heavy an
imaginative and doctrinal freight – transmuted from a reality into a nonreality, from a
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presence into an absence.”109 If Palestine belongs to the whole world, it is difficult to
claim exclusive rights to the actual land. Meanwhile, before the arrival of Zionism,
Palestinian solidarity consisted of a shared consciousness that living in Palestine was
“special.”
The history of the Palestinian people is, at once, authentic and mythological.
Becoming the victim of the Zionist project served as the onus for the majority of these
disaggregated communities inside Palestine to come together. Yet, once this coming
together occurred, Palestinians only occupied the land briefly before Zionist forces either
removed them from the land, forcing them into peripheral colonies or “territories” or
global diaspora. Thus, while Palestinians have a longer documented history within the
land than perhaps any other “people,” their unified understanding and display of their
Palestinianness is quite modern and articulated in response to the Zionist project.
Contemporary Palestinians live in diverse conditions. Palestinians live in Gaza
and the West Bank, in local diaspora in the Levantine region, and in global diaspora.
“Being” Palestinian means different things to these populations. For those living under
Israeli control, it is the reason for their oppression: their desire for Palestine is an
emancipatory project. For those in diaspora, Palestine is something they have lost: they
experience Palestine as a category of dispossession. Again, turning to Said:
In a very literal way, the Palestinian predicament since 1948 is that to be a
Palestinian at all has been to live in a utopia, a nonplace, of some sort…If
we think of Palestine as having the function of both a place to be returned
to and of an entirely new place, a vision partially of a restored past and a
novel future, perhaps even a historical disaster transformed into a hope for
a different future, we will understand better the words meaning.”110
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Palestinians experience Palestine as the manifestation of dispossession and desire. At
once, they experience this tangibly: through the keys of the houses their families have left
and the moments of Palestinian communitas that bring meaning and joy to their lives.
Simultaneously, they experience the idea of Palestine, as a “nonplace,” an axis mundi,
the mystical utopia from where they came and will return.

5.3 The Zionist Treatment of its Victims
While the Zionist worldview imparts a unique oppression upon the Palestinians,
the way the Palestinian is less distinctive. Zionism assumed the Orientalist structure of
interpretation other colonial apparatuses employed, again distinguished by the fact that
Zionism imagined itself as a native movement. The Zionists perspective of the Arab was
flexible. The Arab characterized various, often contradictory, qualities depending on the
relation they held to the hegemonic Zionist occupation. For example, to the Zionist, the
Arab man simultaneously embodies the rage of terrorism and an effeminate submission
that legitimates their domination. Arab women are exotic objects of sexual fantasies, but
also evidence the misogyny and repression of Arab society. For all its mystical
aggrandizement through languages of destiny, messianism, and world-historical
redemption, Zionism is an imperial ideology: “a political philosophy whose aim and
purpose for being is territorial expansion and its legitimation.”111 However, territorial
expansion is only partially the act of domination and bloodshed that establish a foreign
power over new land. Colonialism always needs a grand idea that justifies the procedural
violence. This philosophy entails manifold operations and coercive manipulations to
produce a the self-constituting hegemony of the colonizer, both within the occupier and
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the occupied. The new power engages in successive and interdependent acts of
rearranging, renaming, reinterpreting, resituating, and reappropriating, until the land they
occupy not only justifies their occupation, but the ideas behind and driving their action.
The Palestinian appears to the Israeli as whatever is necessary in the moment to
justify the occupation and Israeli colonial culture. This staging of the Palestinian occurs
through, “ flexible positional superiority.” Through overwhelming force and control over
the means of representation, the Israeli enters into, “a whole series of possible
relationships with the Orient without ever losing the relative upper hand.”112 Notoriously,
the Palestinian plays two incompatible roles in Israeli imperialism: both the marauding
terrorist whose actions permanently mark the consciousness of the Israel or as a nonentity who does not belong. These popular characterizations of Palestinians are two of
many representations that can secure Israeli hegemony and continue reproducing the
imperial idea. Representing Palestinians as both terrorists and non-existent secures Israel
the broadest range of potential action, while minimizing their responsibility. It allows
Israel to act without regard to its indigenous population and, when forced to take the
Palestinian into account, treat their appearance as unreasonable and requiring exceptional
force.
The Israeli treatment of the indigenous Palestinian population is characterized by
an absence of interdependence. From the original Zionist discourses to present day Israel,
the indigenous Palestinian appears superfluous to the settler colonial project. At best, the
Palestinian consents peacefully. At worst, they resist. The project has never seriously
determined the Palestinians’ place within it. As Said wrote, this corresponds with the fact
that Palestinians are always depicted as what is outside of Zionism. This strict delineation
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itself derives from the premise that the land of Palestine has always been Israeli, waiting
outside of time for redemption and reclamation by a Jewish national awakening. Contrary
to many narratives of smooth return, where the Zionists and the land effortlessly flourish,
the settlers needed to clear the land of other stories before they could perform their own
production. The ideology claimed that the land was empty, pure, and untouched, waiting
for the return of the Jews. Inconsistent with this belief, the land was occupied by diverse
persons with centuries of their cultural heritage inscribed into the land.
The Zionist response to the inadequacy of their fabrication was twofold. First,
they deterritoialized and reterrirorialized the land and the culture. Second, they engaged
in a campaign of purging and pacifying the indigenous population. Deterrirorialization
and reterrirorialization normally refer to the processes colonial powers used to integrate a
new people into their empire or a new economic subject into a market. In each case the
unique social system of the subject needed to be destroyed (deterrirorialization) and
replaced with the social relations and culture of the imperial system (reterrirorialization).
For example, the British enclosure acts were parliamentary decisions that closed access to
common land. Subsequently, the feudal relations of peasants and lord were no longer a
tenable social and economic system. The bourgeois class deterritorialized feudal England
by legally eradicating the common or cooperatively owned land, which the peasants
required for their feudal tribute. However, the lords could buy the common land as
private property to maintain their source of income. Now they could exploit the peasants
through relations of landowner and tenant. Thus, the British countryside was
reterritorialized by the capitalist social system. A cruder but simpler example of this is
the Nazi deterritorialization and reterritorialization of the German people. The Nazi
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officials burned any media containing values different to their own and replaced them
with Nazi propaganda.
As Said illuminates, the Zionist project never sought to introduce Palestine and its
subjects to diasporic Jewish social relations. It intended to create a New Jew and implant
him as the native in the land. The subject of Israeli deterritorialization and
reterritorialization was the land and the cultural symbols irrevocably connected or
representative of it. Additionally, Zionism sought to create a new Jew by
deterritorializing and reterritorializing the Jewish people. The agricultural, geographical,
archeological, and historic symbols of the land became re-narrated to evidence and attest
to the truth of the Zionist project.113 Meanwhile, Jews were re-fashioned, re-education,
and inscribed with the same narratives. The historically important point of these
processes is that Zionists did not arrive in a land with a superfluous indigenous
population. The Zionist produced the superfluousness of the Palestinians through violent
operations and subsequently erased the memory of the Palestinians and the crimes against
them.

5.4 The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine
The ethnic cleansing of Palestine in 1948 has been understudied. For a long time,
very little serious scholarship existed in English. Benny Morris’s prolific writing on the
topic was the first serious, judicious attempt at interrogating Israeli military archives to
challenge the ridiculous notion that Palestinians left spontaneously and voluntarily.114
While Morris clearly argued that the Palestinian exodus was planned and executed by the
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Haganah, Irgun, and LEHI, he synthesizes his narrative from military testimony, which
often excluded a good portion of the story. The paramilitaries had not been incorporated
under the control of the state, so the testimonies were taken without an accountable
review process or institutionalized scrutiny. Thus, English speakers lacked the full picture
of the ethnic cleansing until 2006 when Ilan Pappe published an account that combined
Israeli military documents with Israeli and Palestinian oral history.
Before Israeli independence in 1948, while the Irgun and LEHI engaged in a
campaign of terror against the British and Palestinian population, Ben-Gurion and the
Yishuv allocated their time and resources to the carefully detailed mapping and charting
of indigenous communities.115 The settler government conducted an aerial photography
project of Palestinian villages. In 1947, the cartographic department, housed in the Tel
Aviv “red house,” knew the location of each village, its roadways, its transport capacity,
its population, its access to natural resources, and its religious composition. The amassed
information served to help the administration understand the space they would control
after the British left. According to United Nations resolution 181, once the British
mandatory period ended, the territory would become divided between Zionist and Arab
control. Two months before the withdrawal, Zionist leadership agreed that it would not
honor the partition. Instead, they devised Plan Dalet: an operation to take over the land
and expel the indigenous population by force.116
The scope of Plan Dalet was extensive. “Judging by the end result of this stage,
namely April-May 1948, this advice was not to spare a single village. Whereas Plan Dalet
gave the villages the option to surrender, the operational orders did not exempt any
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Pappé, Ilan. 2006. The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine. Oxford: Oneworld. Page 17-18.

116

Ibid. Page 41.

98

village for any reason.”117 The effectiveness of the plan was only partially dependent
upon military force. The force was preceded by public messages to the Arabs that Israel
held no intent to include Palestinians: if they stayed, it would cost them their livelihood.
The mix of this message and public uses of overwhelming force caused mass flight. In
early April 1948, the Igrun and LEHI joined forces to begin an assault on the Palestinian
town of Deir Yassin. The paramilitaries blocked the front entrance to the town and played
a message over the speakerphone in Arabic, communicating to the inhabitants that they
were being confronted by an more powerful force and their only options was to leave
through the back exit.118 While Israeli estimates on the civilians killed have lowered from
170 to 93, the quantitative estimates do not accurately depict the terror of the inhabitants.
Among the massacred were 30 babies.119 Plan Dalet used tactics that minimize casualties,
while maximizing terror and subsequently forcing the Palestinians to accept expulsion.
After Deir Yassin, Palestinian villages received a break from assault as Plan Dalet
turned to removing Arab inhabitants from urban areas. They intensified the shelling of
Arab Haifa, along with adding sniper fire and pouring gasoline and liquid explosives
down the mountainside.120 As the case in many Palestinian cities, the inhabitants with the
capital to leave and restart their life did so. The urban population left to fight was the
newly leaderless poor. After Haifa, the Haganah moved quickly through Safad to Acre.
Throughout both crusader and Napoleonic military attempts, Acre developed a reputation
as a historically difficult military target. By the time it became the subject of Israeli siege,
it was overcrowded with new refugees from surrounding Arab villages. Though never
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publically confessed, testimonies and Red Cross and Crescent reports incriminate Israel’s
use of biological weapons. For the first time in its 200-year history, in the midst of the
war, the aqueduct that supplied the water to Acre carried typhoid to the inhabitants. As
Pappe writes:
With their morale weakened by both the typhoid epidemic and the
intensive shelling, residents heeded the call from loudspeakers that
shouted at them: ‘surrender or commit suicide. We will destroy you to the
last man.’ Lieutenant Petite, a French UN observer, reported that after the
city fell into Jewish hands, there was widespread and systematic looting
by the army, including furniture, clothes, and anything that might be
useful to the new Jewish immigrants, and the removal of which might
discourage the refugees’ return.121
After Acre, the Haganah returned to the villages. Again, they continued their tactic of
terror. In Ayn al-Zaytun, which became the model for later village expulsions, the
villages were taken to the edge of the town where the Jewish troops fired shots over their
head, ordering them to leave. Prior to their flight, however, the forces stripped them of
their belongings.122 Once the “intercommunal” war became the Israeli-Arab war on May
15th, with members of the Arab League declaring war on Israel, most Palestinian villages
had been razed and urban populations expelled. Only once this massive, premeditated
expulsion occurred, could Israel claim such dichotomized social relations between Jew
and Arab, occidental and oriental, civilized and savage.

5.5 Memoricide and the Production of Binaries
After the Palestinians were physically removed from their lands, Israelis
continued their process of “hebrewization” or “judizing” of the land. The central
government employed geographers, historians, and archeologists to reinvent the
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landscape. In 1949, groups of scholars from the “naming committee” journey through the
newly captured Palestinian territories to renumerate the land.123 They sought to apply the
ideology to the landscape, to create a fertile environment for the New Jew and his
worldview.124 The Palestinians belonged to places that no longer existed.
After the geographic redemption of the land, the government began its botanical
redemption. The Jewish National Fund confiscated huge swaths of Palestinian lands for
“public use.” They were tasked with manicuring a “Jewish, European-looking, and
green” Israel. On the ruins of the recently cleansed Palestinian lands, the JNF planted
forests. The botanical project of the land paralleled the return of Jews to Israel. Just as the
Jew would flourish in the land, the land would blossom with the return of its people.
Thus, the forests the JNF planted realized the Zionist trope of, “making the desert
bloom.” Although, the JNF chose to use only 11% indigenous species, the forests
provided the New Jews an opportunity to experience the veracity of Zionism.125 Hiking
and agrotourism are still very popular forms of recreation in Israeli culture. The forests
were meant to be experienced and were built with hiking trails, historical markers, and
lodging. However, while Israelis visit to watch the blossoming of nonindigenous fig and
almond trees bloom to mark the end of winter, the forests work politically to cover any
Palestinian attempt at return or commemorative act.
The JNF’s project changed the narrative of the land both in the context of
contemporary ownership and the historical narratives it could contain. Confronted with
the task of building forests on top of the recently evacuated Palestinian civilization, the
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JNF needed to decide which buildings to preserve, which to excavate, and which to
demolish. As curators of the Zionist lands, the decision followed the Zionist historical
narrative. They excavated the ruins of antiquity and anything with Christian or Jewish
value detachable from the Palestinian population. Any buildings that could attest to the
millennia of Palestinian culture were demolished. The largest man-made forest in Israel,
Birya, covers six Palestinian villages, including Ayn al-Zaytun. The historical markers,
tours, and online descriptions of the forest follow a timeline that skips from the biblical
period, to the Talmudic period, and then directly to the forest’s creation in 1948.
Meanwhile, the new immigrants and refugees to Israel were subject to
contrapuntal curating projects and enforced historical amnesias. As discussed earlier,
after the state gained independence, it received and encouraged global mass migration.
Jews from India to the Americas, from Scandinavia to South Africa joined the new
nation. They experienced their Jewishness differently and held diverse expectations of the
Zionist project. The Israeli government and society began an intensive program that
might be best characterized as “deglobalization.” As with the land, the Zionist began a
large, intricate project of subordinating the proliferation and commemoration of lived
experiences that contradicted their ideology and its narratives. As Ella Shohat writes in
her collection of essays on the topic, Taboo Memories, Diasporic Voices:
The idea of the unique, common victimization of all Jews at all times
provides a crucial underpinning of official Israeli discourse. The notion
uniqueness precludes analogies and metonymies, thus producing a
selective reading of “Jewish history,” – one that hijacks Mashreqian and
Maghrebian Jews from their Judeo-Islamic geography and subordinates
that geography to that of the Ashkenazi shtetl. This double process entails
the performance of commonalities among Jews in the public sphere so as
to suggest a more homogeneous national past, while silencing any
deviance into a more globalized and historicized narrative that would see
Jews not simply through their religious commonalities but also in relation
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to their contextual cultures institutions, and practices... In the Zionist
“proof” of a single Jewish experience there are no parallels or
overlappings with other religious and ethnic communities, whether in
terms of a Jewish hyphenated and syncretic culture or in terms of a linked
analogous oppression. All Jews are defined as closer to each other than to
the cultures of which they have been a part.126
Again, the Zionist movement rejected any ambiguity of the Jewish heritage between the
cultural and ethnic dichotomy of east/west or occident/orient. The Jews living in Arab
lands fully belonged to both the category of oriental and Arab and the category of Jew,
synonymous to Occidental for Zionists. Thus, the Mizrahi Jew was unintelligible and
inassimilable to the Zionist world historical narrative. As a result, Arab Jews acquired
second-class citizenship.
The simplest way to explain the oppression of Arab and African Jews in Israel is
to demonstrate how their material and ideological place within Israel parallel one another.
The Arab Jews were brought to Israel with the intent that they would serve as the
uneducated, proletarian labor source. Of course, the Zionists believed they were
liberating the Arab-Jews from a cultural backwater, even more repressive of religious
difference than their own. In many cases, this was false. In Baghdad, even after the
Holocaust and Israeli independence, records show that most residents showed very little
desire to leave. The city maintained a long history of inclusion. Unlike Europe where
narratives of the wandering Jews made the identity synonymous with rootlessness, the
Iraqi Jews held less doubt that they belonged where they lived. Once Israeli diplomats
arranged easy emigration for Iraqi Jews, very few accepted the offer. In turn, the Zionist
agents resorted to “cruel Zionism – namely the idea that Zionists had to use violent
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means to dislodge Jews from Exile.”127 After the bombing of the Masouda Shemtob
synagogue, the Jews of Baghdad left for Israel, in many cases greeted by bureaucrats who
deemed their names impossible to pronounce and renaming them, just as they had done
with the land.
The Israeli need for labor expedited the resort to cruel Zionism. Before
independence, the country depended on Palestinian labor. Even the Kibbutz founded on
socialist ideals and practices quickly turned to buying Palestinian labor. With the ethnic
cleansing of the indigenous population, the Zionist pioneers turned to the “Sephardi
option.” The importation of young, strong Eastern Jews added a temporary third, middle
category, between Jew and Arab, in the Zionist hierarchy. The establishment determined
that labor should be done by, “Jews in the form of Arabs.”128 The Zionists’ orientalist
belief in the underdevelopment of Arab land translated into a belief that the Jews coming
from places like Baghdad, Sana, or pastoral cultures would be proficient in agriculture.
As a result, the Arab immigrants were expected to labor, without training, for exploitive
wages. The Western Jews, who owned the means of production, disdained the Arabs for
failing to work with the productivity of trained Palestinian labor. Yet, the exploitation
Arab-Jewish labor produced twenty years of sustained, quick economic development.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Arab-Jews are still remembered as arriving to Israel slovenly,
uncooperatively and repaying their admission with unproductive behavior. Ironically, the
Western Jews narrative of sacrifice to save the Arab Jews is contradictory to reality: the
labor of the Arab and African Jews saved the nation from economic failure.
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The intolerability of the Arab-Jew to Zionist intelligibility results in the
reworking of dependencies. Systems of interdependence, like the economic success of
early Israel, are transformed into evidence of the dependence of the Arab-Jew on the
Eastern New Jew. These transformations permeate nearly all ideological state apparatuses
and cultural institutions. This produces a hierarchy in which all non-Western or diasporic
identities are dependent on the flourishing and distinguished presence of the Zionist
master narrative in order to hold any right to the public sphere. Manuel de Landa,
alongside Deleuze and Guattari, provide the cleanest tools of analysis for these processes.
Central to expanding or globalizing any systems of oppression, the oppressor must
transform systems of mutual interdependence, or “meshworks,” into hierarchies of
dependence, in which each member recognizes their reliance on persons of higher class,
but hold no obligation to those below them.129 130 In the case of early Israeli economic
development, the systems of mutual dependence between the pioneers and their laborers
was restructured as a history of the lower, oriental proletariat classes failing to fulfill their
obligations to the Western bourgeois.
This class struggle mirrors the cultural and ethnic ideological struggle. As de
Landa argues, processes of homogenization and subsequent re-heterogenization drive the
movement from meshwork to hierarchy. The Zionist pioneers intended that the Eastern
Jews assimilate absolutely. They were placed in housing settlements arranged to promote
a Western lifestyle, in schools that taught them the correct Judaism and whose curricula
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taught the great Yiddish writers, but never the work of Arab Jews.131 The Zionists still
clung to the hope that after immigrating, global Jewry would develop into their
Eurocentric ideal of the New Jew. However, after 1967, when the treaties of the 6-day
war formalized the security of the Zionist project, the paradigm of Israel as a
homogeneous nation no longer felt necessary.132 Instead, social and civic institutions
adopted a paradigm of multiculturalism. However, the era of homogenization still
loomed. The Zionist historical narrative and its supporting assumptions about the nature
of Jewish culture were accepted as the truth. The entire spectrum of multicultural
expression was limited to reproducing this truth. While Iraqi, Yemeni, or Ethiopian
identity and history now entered the public sphere, it was only to verify and display
Zionist postulates.
In his exploration of Jerusalem as a colonial space, Thomas Abowd identifies
potent examples of how this destruction of social heterogeneity, homogenization through
renaming and seperation, and subsequent re-heterogenization under taxonomies favorable
to the reproduction of racial hierarchies. He examines the neighborhood of Talbieh, a
neighborhood for wealthy Arabs that also housed Jewish elites before 1948. In this space,
prone to intellectual hybridization, people like Zalman Schocken, founder of Ha’aretz
and Schocken Books, lived blocks away from Edward Said’s family home. Religion
delineated the major social demarcation within the neighborhood. Oral histories note that
on occasions when children of different Christian denominations would get married, the
parents would mourn and ring their church bells as they would for their respective
131

Shohat, Ella. 1988. "Sephardim in Israel: Zionism from the Standpoint of Its Jewish Victims." Social
Text, no. 19/20
132
Stein, Rebecca L. 2008. Itineraries in Conflict : Israelis, Palestinians, and the Political Lives of
Tourism. Durham: Duke University Press.

106

funerary rites.133 However, within acceptable religious boundaries, social, economic, and
cultural interaction did occur. As educated elites under British colonialism, residents
communicated in English and often ran their businesses in close proximity. Less
orthodox Jews and Arabs developed particularly close connections and, in certain cases,
“friendships and relationships of this kind actually kept Arabs from leaving Palestine as
British rule waned and heightened violence washed over the city in the late 1940s.”134
After the ethnic cleansing of the neighborhood, the social demarcations were
rearticulated along the binary between Arabs and Jews. Confirming the apartheid thesis
that, “difference is preserved through distance,”135 new racialized neighborhoods were
devised to separate populations by these new social logics. Meanwhile, the old
antagonisms faded: it became newly acceptable for to marry between different Christian
sects. However, this reworking entailed a variety of processes to demarcate new
boundaries and homogenize the space within. Talbieh was renamed “Komemiyut,”
Hebrew for independence. The nearby neighborhoods of Qatamon and Baq’a became
Gonen (defense) and Geulim (redemption). Meanwhile, when historical sites or
landmarks contained narratives that created some ambiguity in the ethnic purity of a
neighborhood, they were destroyed or attached to different narratives. For example, prior
to Israeli occupation, the beautiful home of renowned Palestinian architect Andoni
Baramki professed the owner’s own cultural hybridity by reflecting his forty-year career
with influences from across the Mediterranean and Arab world. After Baramki’s
expulsion, his house served as a fort for LEHI forces, referenced during the 1948 war as
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the Tourjeman Post. In the 1970’s it became the Tourjeman Post Museum, offering
visitor a story of the bravery of LEHI forces against Jordan Snipers. The changing history
of the building is emblematic of the processes of deterritorialization and
reterritorialization necessary for the sustainable reproduction of Zionist social hierarchies.
Beyond these processes, a system of pacification prevents new social hybridity by
enforcing the boundaries of the racial hierarchy.

5.6 Pacification
The Israeli/Palestine conflict is conditioned through perpetually representating the
Orient and the Palestinians outside of Zionism. Meanwhile, Eurocentric hegemony limits
Arab-Jewish expression to tell narratives that contradict their own genealogical
experience and subordinate them to tell the story of their oppressors. However,
unsurprisingly, both groups also have long histories of protest, riot, and resistance to
Israeli domination. Israel domination is not constant. It requires regular reproduction.
Said relies on Gramsci to explicate this point: “the consciousness of one really is…
‘knowing thyself’ as a product of the historical processes to date which has deposited
itself in you an infinity of traces, without leaving an inventory.”136 The inventory is
composed both by acts of oppression directed at the subject and the acts responding to
that oppression. However, Israel’s success at imposing its will upon the land and its
former inhabitants comes through its success at managing the responses of its oppressed
classes.
This is the other face Israel shows to its victims: a system of pacification. From
one perspective, the impositions on Palestinian life used to insure their cooperation and
136 136
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complacency are necessary for Israeli security. On the other hand, they achieve this by
making Palestinian life nearly unlivable. The goal of the pacification is to remove or
dissuade the subject from any form of resistance, ideally achieving perfect docility
through discipline, surveillance, and punishment. Defense minister Ya’akov Amidror
compared this to mowing the grass. The IDF:
…just “mows the grass” of enemy capabilities with no ambition to solve
the conflict. It also attempts to achieve some deterrence to extend the time
between rounds of violence. Periods of tranquility are important for Israel
because its mere existence is a success over radical non-state enemies and
sends them a constant reminder that their destructive goals are not within
reach.137
In between the periods of active warfare or engaged raids, Israel imposes a “matrix of
control.”
The term “matrix of control” emerges from Jeff Halper’s fastidious research in the
West Bank. The term involves the massive bureaucracy Israel forces Palestine to endure,
which impedes movement and communication, and the separation and restriction of
Palestinians from their means of sustenance and any means of resistance. The Matrix of
Control operates at three levels. First, there are the facts on the ground. These include
fixtures like the Israel/West bank wall, internal borders and roadblocks, encirclements of
Palestinian areas, and technologies that monitor movement through surveillance. It also
includes the more abstract aspects of security bureaucracy: military government, planning
and zoning regulations, mass detentions and limitations on civil liberties, creating
categories of people with differential rights and life-spaces, and blurring civil/military
lines in the enforcement of internal security. Lastly, the IDF studies and prepares the
most effective military tactics, setting the global standard in interactive intelligence
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gathering, limited use of unlimited and disproportionate force, complete aerial
occupation, targeted assassinations, urban warfare, and weapons of suppression.138
The matrix of control has become such an effective system that it no longer just
facilitates Israel’s domestic security situation. It has become a commodity, unique to
Israel, for sale on the global market. However, unlike other revenue streams, the sale of
Israeli pacification technologies and techniques foster diplomatic relations. Anti-colonial
world powers like China, Nigeria, and India silence their historical grievances with Israeli
imperialism because of the national ruling classes dependence on Israeli counterinsurgency technology. Meanwhile, crucial geopolitical and trade allies like Azerbaijan
and Ethiopia are webbed in through the same dependencies. The Israeli products and
techniques are so superior because of their testing and refinement in protracted conflict.
The products are sold claiming to be “tested in Gaza” or “used by the IDF.” Through the
global economy Israel’s military occupation becomes its own justification.139
The more important consequence of Israel’s pacification protocol is that it has
undermined any legitimate prospects for a “two-state solution.” Since the origins of the
conflict, the central debate has been between resolution through a single, bi-national state
or two separate nation-states. The two-state solution assumed a division between the two
countries along either the 1949 or 1967 borders. However, the matrix of control operates
by establishing settlements on top of the areas necessary for any type of sovereignty.
Thus, Israeli settlements are not placed in areas where the settlers can find space to live,
but on top of water reserves, transit points, below important airspace, and on top of the
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most arable land. There are about 550,000 Jews living in West Bank settlements.
Originally, the settlements were development towns populated by low-income Arab-Jews
living on the periphery. However, once they became demonstrably and sustainably
secure, Israel’s elites have replaced the population. A two state solution would entail
removing the elites from their land. In addition, Israeli pacification procedures demand
that any major Palestinian town is surrounded by Israeli security and checkpoints.
Meanwhile, Israeli controlled borders encircle the entire West Bank. As a result,
communication and transportation in between Palestinian towns is incredibly difficult and
dangerous. For the two-state solution to work as anything more than straw man, the
Israeli’s would need to concede all West Bank settlements and the Eastern border.
Historically, both have been non-negotiable.
On the global stage, Israel successfully sold the narrative that indigenous
Palestinians were never central to Zionism. Instead the settlers returned to find their land
populated with a fundamentally irrational people who, despite all attempts, could not
understand that they did not belong. Instead of accepting their fate, they resorted to the
methods of terrorism. This narrative only becomes tenable after the Israel campaign to
erase the history of the Palestinians and Arab-Jews. Even so, Zionist thought has always
included the Orient and the Arab within its metrics and imagination. For the Zionist, the
Arab looms large in both thought and practice. The country’s geography, economy,
national holidays, and military originate and operate significantly through the interaction
and confrontation with the Palestinian and Arab.
The Arab threatens the Zionist at two levels. First, the two groups compete over
the same materials: land, water, airspace, transit systems, and borders. However, they are
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also in competition for the means of narration: the ability to tell their own national
stories, to cultivate stable social structures, to affirm belonging, and to appear in the
public sphere. Thus, the Palestinian threatens the Israelis ability to affirm that Zionism is
the world historical truth. The Israeli oppression of Palestinian has never exclusively
been about safety or greed. The ability to demonstrate and have faith in the pristine
veracity and facticity of Zionism requires the oppression of the indigenous population
and the rejection of the Orient.
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Chapter 6: The (Anti)Politics of Militarization
6.1 Managing the Movement
Beyond its treatment of the Palestinians, Zionism suffers from internal
contradictions that render political action impossible. The state insists on its status as a
“Jewish state,” an ethnocracy, and a democracy. Like the contradictory narrative frames
of the Holocaust, these antithetical political systems lack the opposing and negating
aspects one would look for in hope that they would reach a dialectical synthesis. Instead,
both are “managed.” I use the term “management” to denote a substitution for Arendt’s
concept of “action.” Unlike political action, which requires pluralism and serves as an
end in itself, management organizes the polity through training its subjects to act
homogeneously, subsequently allowing for the bureaucracy and society to act as a means
to an end. In Israel, this training occurs through the military penetrating and pervading
society.
In Baruch Kimmerling’s book, The Invention and Decline of Israeliness, he
chronicles the transition from the cosmopolitan paradigm of Zionism, in which the
legitimacy of the state is founded on politics within a specific world historical view, to a
state held together through military management. He argues, “that the strength and
capability of the Israeli military to penetrate society is predicated by the military’s all
embracing and civilian nature. For this reason, the state and its extension through the
military institution has been a major actor in the Zionist story.”141 Since independence,
and even before it, Israel pursued the reckless establishment and pristine realization of
their own ideology and historical fantasy. This project stands in conflict to the path of
141

Kimmerling, Baruch. 2001. The Invention and Decline of Israeliness : State, Society, and the
Military. Berkeley: University of California Press. Page 3.

114

least opposition. The commitment to immaculate realization of Zionist mythology, the
enduring obligation to the social taxonomies and teleology prescribed at the end of the
nineteenth century have come at great material, social, and human sacrifice. Why has the
Zionist narrative and mythology not adapted to meet reality? The historical social
conditions of the settler colony inject military priority and management into every
opportunity for political discourse, judgment, or action. “[T]he situation is one in which
military and other social problems are so highly intermingled that the social and political
issues become construed as ‘existential security’ issues and vice versa, making it almost
impossible to differentiate between them…Israeli civilians are ‘partially militarized and
the military is ‘partially civilianized.”142 This military framework carries its own
framework of values. The dissent and discord necessary for revaluation and adaption
appear worthless to the military paradigm, which can only appreciate the violent
ideological acceleration that helps its goal of establishing and protecting the Zionist
utopia.
Zionism has not always operated inside the military paradigm. The problems
found in Herzl and Nordau’s writings derive from their ignorant acceptance of certain Fin
de Siècle notions of social Darwinism, orientalism, and race science. Only once Zionism
needed reconciliation with the practical demands of building a settler colony could
military impetuses demand ideological stasis. Initially, discourse concerning who
belonged to the state was rare and peripheral. Zionism was a fringe group with few
resources and heavy risks; the leaders could not afford to reject very many people.
Additionally, the concept of the New Jew emphasized transformation as opposed to
inclusion. Instead, Zionist discourse focused on questions of what was right for the state
142
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and movement. After the development and success of the paramilitaries, independence,
mass immigration, and ethnic cleaning, these two sites flipped in primacy. New diversity
and the massive state expenditure to eliminate that diversity brought questions of
Jewishness and belonging to the forefront. Meanwhile, the ascendency of the military
simultaneously delineated the limits of internal disagreement. Political questions could
never challenge the power of the military.
After the founding years, and even more after the 1967 war, two consensuses
marked the boundaries of Israeli politics. Kimmerling labels these the cultural code of
Jewishness and the code of security. The cultural code operates as the discursive partner
of the ethnocratic state. Israeli political positions must be identifiable as Jewish political
positions. When the secular Ashkenazim held clear hegemony over the Zionist project,
they controlled interpretation of the meaning of “Jewish.” With the influx of immigrants
and the pivot to a multicultural paradigm, the meaning became a site of discourse. Thus,
the project that sought to make the Jews, “a nation like all other nations,” developed a
consensus that democracy must serve to retain the distinctly Jewish nature of the state.
The Jewish consensus presents particularly toxic ramifications to the reproduction
of plurality because it undermines any institutionalized politics of intersectional identity.
If an Arab-Jew is driven to a political cause through their Arab identity, they must present
that cause as an interpretation of their Jewish identity. Other aspects, even universalist
aspects, must be presented as an interpretation of Jewishness. Thus, democracy only
extends as far as the Israeli public is willing to interpret the parameters of Judaism. In
practice, this is not as overwhelmingly preventive as one might think. Many leftist and
liberal paradigms of Judaism are flexible and include foreign causes. However, it
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operates discursively to renumerate the demos. The entire spectrum of Israeli political
action can be understood as exclusively Jewish.143
The code of security, better defined as the military-cultural complex, treats
military preparation and the use of force as an “end in itself.” Since independence, the
flourishing of the Israeli people, the space allotted for the good life, has been understood
as coextensive with the potential or actual use of overwhelming military force. This belief
is so fervently supported and immune from questioning, it resembles what sociologists
term a “civil religion.” As the Jaffa Center for Strategic Studies found:
The “religion of security” is a metaphor for considering the phenomena of
security in Israel. Just as a child is born into a certain religion, so too the
Israeli is born into a very difficult geopolitical world with its attendant
dilemmas. Just as a child accepts unquestioningly the religion he was born
into and some basic answers he receives…so too the Israeli child absorbs
at a very early age the basics of the core-belief in national security.144
It is not simply that the “very difficult geopolitical world” results in this faith and
religiosity. The formative instruction in Israeli society trains and indoctrinates citizens
with this belief. Kimmerling characterizes this as “total militarism,” a system in which
most social institutions (economic, industrial, legislative) and cognitive frameworks are
oriented toward preparation for war.145 Schools, holidays, and civic life reproduce a value
system that represents the military as the primary site of Israeli social collectivity. 146
The mutual coopting of civic space by the military and military space by civilians
hollows out the space needed for political discourse. As Kimmerling writes:
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The civilian government, civilian elites, and most of the members of the
collectivity all function as agents of civilian militarism. With respect to
this type of militarism, it is not necessary that the military, as an
institutional structure, govern the political sphere, nor is the military
necessarily stationed at the center of a statist cult. Civilian militarism is
systematically internalized by most statesmen, politicians, and the general
public as a self-evident reality whose imperatives transcend partisan or
social allegiance.147
The potential for the military-cultural complex to eliminate politics is absolute. In 1945,
the British mandate government enacted a series of Emergency Laws that allowed
colonial authorities to override the civil rights of the inhabitants to ensure British
sovereignty and security. In 1948, the Knesset incorporated the provisions into Israeli
law. In 1951, they recognized that the Emergency Laws were irreconcilable with the
basic principles of democracy, but failed to revoke them because they provided the
necessary legal basis for imposing military rule of Israel’s Arab citizens. The Knesset
launched another attempt in 1966, but again found the legal system necessary to “freeze”
the legal rights of Palestinians in the occupied territories.
Israel’s inability to relieve itself of the Emergency Laws, despite recognizing that
they undermine the state’s claim to democracy, illuminates how the
ethnocracy/democracy paradox is resolved. The democracy extends as far as Israel is
comfortable interpreting the cultural code of Jewishness. While it is clear to both Israeli
Jews and global Jews that “Jewishness” and “Jewish people” is a pluralistic category that
contains and promotes a political discourse, this is the perspective of those included
within the democracy. Again, Israel shows its victims a different face. In the state of
expectation, military action, and emergency laws, the state acts in the name of “the
Jewish people.” The entire occupation is predicated on the existence of an imaginary
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homogeneous Jewish population. Perhaps here is the most enduring legacy of the early
Zionists’ desire to create a “New Jew.” The Israeli polity can be interpellated as a
pluralistic democracy and a homogeneous nation. The military framework requires the
homogenous representation. While space is allocated for a “Jewish democracy,” the
omnipresence, or omni-potentiality, of the military in Israeli civic life ensures that it can
always be overridden by the mobilized ethnocracy.

6.2 Politics of Fear: The Totalitarianization of The Zionist Project
In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt explains why the Zionist project insists
on realizing its dreams of ethnic purity, memoricide, and hyper-militarism. Like other
19th and 20th century ideologies, Zionism offers a teleological understanding of history. It
insisted that in order to achieve this telos, Jews comport to the figure of the New Jew and
an imagined stage for them to perform this character. Politics, an unpredictable action
that cannot achieve a goal, is replaced with motion, progress toward the pre-determined
telos. Structurally, this ideology resembles the totalitarian ideology Arendt described.
However, Arendt’s equation for totalitarianism expects that a regime of terror pervade the
polity to remove the freedom to imagine oneself as anything outside of the ideology. Nazi
Germany and Soviet Russia induced terror through arbitrary violence, the universal
recognition that today’s executioner may become tomorrows executed. Israel has no
regime akin to this. Certainly, it practices arbitrary detention and, occasionally, execution
of its colonized peoples, but the Jewish population does not hold these fears. Arendt’s
understanding is useful because terror is subjective. Historical Jewish terror crops up
throughout nationalist discourses to justify the singular truth of military Zionism. With its
non-linear nature, terror’s social relations can be reproduced as long as the motion of the
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polity is determined by a response to terror, its contemporary projections, and ideological
path forward.
Zionism’s contemporary clout arose on the coattails of the Holocaust. Unlike
Arendt’s examples of totalitarianism, Israel does not produce terror. Instead, it reproduces
it. Jacqueline Rose explains Zionism’s resort to militarism and exploitation as, “not so
much restitution, as the colossal sublimation of historical pain.”148 The Zionists depicted
every adversary to their project as both an echo and a seedling of the modern Jewish
adversary: the Nazi empire. They projected the image of Nazi terror both forward and
backward. In the paradigm of the Holocaust as eternal return, not only does the
Palestinian farmer defending his land resemble a pogrom and the Arab family walking
through Jaffa look like a band of “brown shirts,” but also every historical instance of
Jewish oppression appears as an iteration of Nazi antisemitism.
It is not only this terror, a reading of Jewish history through the lens of Nazi Jew
hatred, which prevents revaluation and adaptation of the Zionist ideology. The Zionist
ideology emphasizes the response to these Nazi phantoms. It was the diasporic Jew who
responded to Nazi oppression by accepting their suffering with the silence of Job,
fearfully begging for answers on the way to the gas chamber. The New Jew meets the
Nazi with the full force of the IDF. The critique here is not the violence towards Nazis,
but the Zionists ability to depict any opposition as Nazism and then prescribe
nonnegotiable violence in response. Thus, Jewish terror in Israel is not produced through
reanimations of Nazism and pogroms, but through a fear of fear:
Suffering, not just the response to real and present danger, becomes
something like a national disgrace. Once the link was made between
suffering and humiliation, once – we might say – the problem of historical
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injustice became a narcissistic wound, then any perceived assault on the
Jews, regardless of its reasons, becomes, not just a danger (and even when
in fact no danger at all), an affront to the Jewish self. The history of the
creation of Israeli nation is in part the history of one displacement after
another, in which, time and time again, the enemies of the Jews turn into
the shades of past persecution, each one at once real and unreal, infinitely
dangerous and a ghost.149
Facing the opposition, Israel withdraws from any responsibility to the truth, and, out of
fear, responds only as ideology prescribes. This is a totalitarian relation.
Israel, while not a totalitarian state, faces it’s “other,” the Arab, the Palestinian,
and memories of Arabness, with a totalitarian response. Responsibility, if one wished to
assign it, weights differently, because the Jews in Israel confront fear created by others.
Yet, Arendt’s analysis of totalitarianism is useful for understanding how the Zionist
paradigm uses that fear to justify and realize its own fantasies. Simply, it deprives the
Israeli of the freedom to imagine their relationship to the Palestinian differently. Again,
we confront the difficulty of holding victims accountable for their own victims.

6.3 Dialogue and Depoliticization
The breadth of institutions attempting to mange the Israel/Palestine conflict
stretches across the spectrum of political beliefs. While the military-industrial complex
develops pacification technologies and capabilities, liberal NGOs achieve a similar result
through dialogue, inter-cultural, and narrative sharing groups. Groups like “Seeds of
Peace” or “Children of Peace,” teach agendas of tolerance that are recognizably
inapplicable to large scale reconciliation. Thus, these groups claim to be a model for
something that they can never be. Instead, they curb the boundaries of acceptable dissent
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and demands to this model of tolerance. Through these organizations Israel colonial
hegemony becomes the synchronized project of both the Zionist right and left.
Dialogue groups are founded upon practicing identity politics in a manner that
does not inhibit any narratives from entering the conversation. In the case of Seeds of
Peace, an Israel and a Palestinian are placed in a camp together in Otisfield, Maine. The
program beings with the assumption that the conflict rests latently within the racial,
religious, and ethnic inheritance of each camper. Subsequently, the project of tolerance
attempts to remove the friction inherent the identities by practicing moderated
cohabitation. The issue, as Wendy Brown points out, is that this depoliticizes the conflict.
It practices “removing a political phenomenon from the comprehension of its historical
emergence and from a recognition of the powers that produce and contour it.”150 With
this assumption, the training these programs often offer is not an alternative political
space that can challenge, reformulate, and work through historical injustices in a different
manner than everyday Israel/Palestine can offer, but teaches a mode of disposition and
behavior that manages conflicting narratives, histories, and perspectives without conflict
or friction.
The practice that dialogue groups offer is only half of the cyclical relationship
maintained between storytelling and politics. Any story may be told in the public space,
however, these stories lack the power to change the world around them based upon the
truth they disclose. Instead of conflicting stories coming together to produce a new
perspective, interpretation of the world, or paradigm of justice, they can only reproduce
the current paradigm because their presence has effect on the power relations they exist
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within. Without the interaction between stories, dialogue groups end up substituting
“emotional and personal vocabularies for political ones in formulating solutions to
political problems.”151 The futility of society, in the Arendtian sense, or management
becomes critical, “when the ideal of practice of tolerance is substituted for justice or
equality, when sensitivity to or even respect for the other is substituted for justice for the
other, when historically induced suffering is reduced to ‘difference’ or to a medium of
‘offense,’ when suffering as such is reduced to a problem of personal feeling, then the
field of political battle and political transformation is replaced with an agenda of
behavioral, attitudinal and emotional practices.”152
Simultaneously, this discourse offers more liability than opportunity. Tolerance
can become akin to a fashion. In comparison to a discourse of justice, tolerance
emphasizes form over content. Ironically, this allows for punitive injustice to be
perpetuated against those lacking this affect of tolerance. The Palestinians who organize
for justice in a way that rejects Israeli narratives of belonging are labeled as and punished
for being intolerant. In this way, the dialogue groups act like a wall, both preventing
Jews, Israelis, and Palestinians from organizing for justice in a serious and effective
manner, and serving as something for the agents of state violence to “pin them against,”
as a disciplinary example.
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Chapter 7: Urgent Futures
To conclude, this section engages the challenges and promises of a shared future
between the Israelis and Palestinians. Given my own position, I want to highlight the path
forward for Jewish people upset with the manner Zionism and the rejection of the
Palestinian has transformed Judaism. I believe that by illuminating the discursive territory
and historical legitimacy certain Judaisms have lost to Zionism, and presenting these as
alternatives to Jewish colonialism, it can invigorate both Jewish and Palestinian
resistance to military Zionist hegemony and increase the legitimacy that global powers
and institutions can condemn and punish the crimes of “modernity’s great victims.” With
this goal, I also want preface the tone of this section. The previous chapters have offered
the “pessimism of the intellect,” confronting the reader with the truth of an oppressive
history. As Gramsci loved to write, this must be met by an “optimism of the will,” a
certain hopeful disposition and determination that prevents the necessary historical
inquiry from defeating our emancipatory aspirations.
In line with Gramsci’s thought this chapter shows that there are truly meaningful
frameworks for cohabitation and mutual belonging. However, these are no alternatives
we can slide into, latent utopias that can appear through the sharing of ideas. These are
ideas that must be fought for by the Palestinians anded the global community that seeks
justice for them. Also, and unfortunately, there are no alternatives without some
discomfort and sacrifice on the part of global Jewry. Namely, the Jewish impunity
developed through the global manipulations of Holocaust memory will need to be
abandoned. By no means does this entail forgetting the Holocaust, or “getting over it,”
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but does demand that it can be brought into the present in a manner that does not free
Jews of their ethical and historical obligations to the world.
First, this section examines the challenges of Jewish and Palestinian mutuality and
explores political structures able to handle the complexity of these relations. Afterward, I
engage Said’s writings toward the end of his life that reflect on the importance of exile in
the age of nationalism and how the influence of exile to the Jews and Palestinian can
create futures outside the mutual exclusion of the colonizer and colonized. Next, it bases
these structures and futures within the culture and ethos of Jewish cosmopolitanism,
giving a historical basis for these futures to draw from Freud, Said, and Deutscher. While
Jewish cosmopolitanism has lost much of its popularity after the rise of Jewish
nationalism, the social conditions produced by globalization offer an opportunity for
revival. This revival, I argue, offers the opportunity for Jewish cosmopolitanism to
become a global movement, in turn, resituating Jewish belonging in a more just position
in the world order, as opposed to the de facto legitimation for the United States.

7.1 The Last Option: From Freedom to Belonging
The disappearance of the two-state solution both empowers and disturbs those
seeking a just future for the Palestinian and Jewish people. The parallel goals of
achieving self-determination through a sovereign state have disappeared. Unchecked and
enduring Israeli domination has undermined attempts to build two separate polities, one
that belongs to the Palestinian people and one that belongs to the Jewish people. Instead,
both groups are doomed to cohabitation. The clarity this fate offers is empowering. The
consensus produced through Israel’s destruction of all other alternatives beyond a single,
shared state brings with it the wounds and trauma Israel has inflicted upon the
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Palestinians, but it is a consensus nonetheless. The unity it provides allows engagement
with the conflict to be prefaced by a much cleaner dichotomy than it has ever held. The
mandate of cohabitation simplifies the conflict between those willing to recognize Israeli
and Palestinian “right to have rights,” within the land and those unwilling.
In turn, “Justice for Palestine” becomes less a call for liberation from colonial
forces, though this is certainly a valid and useable framework, and more accurately a
demand for a legitimate, public, and sustainable belonging for Palestinians. The irony of
this should loom large. The Palestinians are now engaged in a political project quite
similar to the one that dispossessed them of land in the first place. Accordingly,
Palestinians now need critiques of the Zionist project that are also constructive, as well as
destructive. As in so many other cases, the follies of the colonizer often become the
follies of the colonized. In contrast, Palestine has historically lead the Middle East in its
insistence for a pluralizing democracy.
These intersecting agendas seem to prescribe a relatively simple solution: a
binational, democratic state for both peoples. Voluntary commitment to a binational state
has seen great success in the creation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which went from the
blistering trauma of the Yugoslav wars to a state with high, and steadily growing, human
development. These achievements were facilitated by a decentralized political system
that consists of three presidents that represent the three major ethnic groups, a bicameral
legislature, two major autonomous regions: the Republika Srpska and Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the locally administered Brčko District. The federation is
formed by ten cantons that are administered by the local Bosniak and Croatian
democratic parties. Competition for power between the two groups is fierce and often
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leads to political stasis. However, the decentralized state reduces the scale and effects of
the competition. Though it is recognized as an unwieldy system, it has been relatively
viable and has proven its ability to adapt to the challenges of a new and diverse state.
Despite the capabilities of new forms of pluralistic political systems, in many
respects Israel/Palestine is an unprecedented polity. Nearly one in three Palestinians live
abroad. The level of wealth and education differs vastly throughout the homeland and
diaspora. In parallel, Israel also represents about one third of global Jewry. In any
formulation of the two ethnic groups within a single polity, both demand a right of return
for their exiled members. In contrast, levels of commitment and identification with the
homeland differ within both groups. Many Jews do not subscribe to the belief that life in
Israel constitutes a “return” or is a necessity for the continuation of Jewish life. Many
Palestinians have integrated within their new countries. In both cases, intersectional
groups like American-Jews or Chilean-Palestinians are groups distinct and independent
from Israel/Palestine. So, even with the binational option or “One State Solution” as the
only outcome without more projects of ethnic cleansing, many important questions linger
about the relationship between the homeland and the diaspora.
To complicate things more, Palestine cannot simply be added to Israel. Since it’s
founding, the Zionist movement has focused on removing the ambiguity of the Jew in the
Eurocentric worldview. The structure of Zionist thought employs antagonistic
dichotomies between the Orient and the Occident, tradition and modernity, and
redemption and backwardness. In practice, it has realized these ambitions ruthlessly and
at great cost. Israeli identity will need to be excavated and re-conceived if a binational
state or cohabited state is to exist.
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On the global stage, Israel and Palestine will both need to rework their alliances.
Many of Israel’s global supporters depict the state as a symbol of settler colonialism,
Eurocentric progress, militarism, anti-totalitarianism, white supremacy, and anti-Arab or
Islamaphobic sentiments. Reciprocally, the Palestinian struggle holds the support of
antisemites, Arab nationalists, anti-colonial movements, and Islamism. Both ethnic
groups will need to disavow, minimalize, or differently avow these sources of support in
order to form a single polity.
Developing some form of narrative and ideological mutuality between Israel and
Palestine is still the challenge that looms largest. Both groups hold the rejection of the
“Other” as formative to their identity and social solidarity. The formal federal bond
between the groups will be insufficient to warrant the level of sacrifice demanded from
both groups in order to form a binational democracy. Currently, Israel and Palestine both
recognize themselves as independent from the other, with any mutual obligation
produced by their counterpart’s irrational stubbornness or zealotry. On the contrary, any
future removed from this gridlock, one that hopes for a dynamic good life, instead of the
static accumulation of enemy casualties is interdependent and shared. Once, or if, the
reality of the one-state solution dawns, the immediate questions becomes how do Israel
and Palestine create a shared national identity?

7.2 The Pluralizing Tradition of the Non-Jewish Jew
For Edward Said, Jews and Palestinians occupy, not only the same land, but also
the same cultural space of modernity. Both groups are exilic peoples. Without a state,
they lack a place of belonging and are perceived as suspicious foreigners in any public
sphere they occupy. Secular nationalist modernity confronted them with a political
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lexicon incapable of expressing their fundamental challenges, leading to existential fears
of impermanence, deep feelings of alienation, and the inescapable challenge of seeing
oneself as anything other than a “nonentity.” Yet, at the same time, many of the great
cultural achievements of modernity come from the exilic experience. The rigor and
creative force of exilic thinkers, writers and poets lends, “dignity to a condition legislated
to deny dignity – to deny an identity to a people.”153 Still, this is only half the story of
exilic achievement. Modernity, and the rise of the capitalist state, has resulted in an age
of repression, anxiety, sickliness, slavishness, and, above all, alienation. As György
Lukács argues, the characteristic achievement of modern culture, the novel, is a product
of the pervasive experience of “transcendental homelessness.”154 Thus, just as warfare,
imperialism, and totalitarianism increase the number of people in exile, the experience of
being in the world has become more exilic. These two trends heighten the importance of
exile in modernity.
Meanwhile, there is another perspective to exile that explores how such deep pain
produces the apex of human flourishing and injects the world with an essential vitality.
Exile, the deprivation of the very communal belong that makes one human, forces the
exiled person to imagine community from perspectives that might be untenable and
unimaginable within the established community. Through this understanding, Said
describes exile in a manner harmonious with Arendt. The dissonant view of the exile
contradicts the stasis and homogeneity of the nation-state, supplying a dangerously static
system with necessary dynamism:
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Lukács, György. 1971. The Theory of the Novel: A Historico-Philosophical Essay on the Forms of
Great Epic Literature. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press.

129

Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a
heritage. It affirms the home create by a community of language, culture,
and customs; and, by doing so, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its
ravages. Indeed, the interplay between nationalism and exile is like
Hegel’s dialectic of servent and master, opposites informing and
constituting each other.155
The difference between the allegory of the servant and the master is that nationalism does
not constitute the exile as something that is “whole.” Nationalism insists that the modern
community represent itself with a minimum of homogeneity, continuity, and seriality.156
Exiles, both as a person and as experiences or sensations that are exilic, are the
indigestible bits that cannot be assimilated to the nationalist framework while
maintaining order and integrity. From the perspective of the nation, the exile always
appears fragmentary, conspicuous, and unwieldy.
While the nation accuses the exile of being discontinuous, the presence of the
exile accuses the nation of being hollow. As Walter Benjamin famously postulated,
history does not follow a linear schedule, shooting through “homogeneous empty time.”
Instead, it is structured by historical thresholds, where humanity bursts through the
mundane reproduction of systemic oppression and binds themselves to an eternal
revolutionary spirit of the human condition. This reading of time, drawn from a mix of
Jewish mysticism, Marxism, and exilic sentiments, accuses all linear, nationalist
narratives of lying: of creating illusory ties between these fragments. However, until the
community rejects the present order, these illusory linkages carry power and the right to
belong is contingent on their acceptance.
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The exile, surround by polities with narratives they do not belong to and which
trap them as either pariah or parvenu, attempt to create a new polity of their own with
other rejected persons. This task demands that they connect their diverse array of
fragmented belonging and discontinuous identity by manipulating their history into a
national vision. They achieve this, Said writes, “by choosing to see themselves as part of
a triumphant ideology or restored people. The crucial thing is that a state of exile free
from this triumphant ideology – designed to reassemble an exile’s broken history into a
new whole – is virtually unbearable, and impossible in today’s world.”157 Without
nationalism, or some “triumphant ideology,” the former exiles lack an assurance of
belonging and mutuality. The project of building a community of exiles holds both great
liability and great opportunity. On one hand, the coming together of desperate and
dissonant voices, coming together to build an intersubjective life, is the basis of politics.
On the other hand, the task of building an exilic state comes only out of disconnection
and involuntary separation from the preexisting world. In response, even at its most
successful, exile is a jealous state:
What you achieve is precisely what you have no wish to share, and it is in
the drawing of lines around you and your compatriots that the least
attractive aspects of being in exile emerge: a exaggerated sense of group
solidarity, and a passionate hostility to outsiders, even those who may in
fact be in the same predicament as you. What could be more intransigent
than the conflict between Zionist Jews and Arab Palestinians? Palestinians
feel that they have been turned into exile by the proverbial people of exile,
the Jews. But the Palestinians also know that their own sense of national
identity has been nourished in the exile milieu, where everyone not a
blood-brother or sister is an enemy, where every sympathizer is an agent
of some unfriendly power, where the slightest deviation from the accepted
group line is an act of the rankest treachery and disloyalty. Perhaps this is
the most extraordinary of exile’s fates: to have been exiled by exiles…It is
as if the reconstructed Jewish experience, as represented by Israel and
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modern Zionism, could not tolerate another story of dispossession and loss
to exist alongside it.158
The desire for belonging, and the flight to escape one’s condemnation of being unable to
belong, is a cruel battle. To connect the fragments of discarded persons, a certain level of
homogeneity must be introduced. This homogeneity is always hard fought and is,
historically, not built on something, which is “true,” from a rigorous historical
perspective, but is jerry-rigged to catalyze different exilic sufferings. Zionism told lies
and hid the truth to insure the verisimilitude of its narrative. The vigor with which it
clung to its own illusions certainly grew from the diversity of people the project sought to
include. However, Zionism’s desire to produce something absolutely homogeneous, a
single “New Jew,” from a world of Jews prevented the minimum of heterogeneity
necessary for revaluation and reconsidering the steadfastness of the project.
Within the “essential sadness” of exile, there is also the essential freedom that
exile offers, not only to the exiled, but also to the world. Through rejection from the
known order and the need to build new communities from nothing but the mutuality of
their own rejection, exiles can illuminate new orders and expand the limits of the
possible. Searching for the power that inhabits exile, Said writes:
I speak of exile not as a privilege, but as an alternative to the mass
institutions that dominate modern life. Exile is not, after all, a matter of
choice: you are born into it, or it happens to you. But, provided that the
exile refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, there are things to be
learned: he or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indignant or sulky)
subjectivity…seeing “the entire world as a foreign land” make possible
originality of vision. Most people are principally aware of one culture, one
setting one home; exiles are aware of at least two, and this plurality of
vision gives rise to an awareness of simultaneous dimensions, an
awareness that – to borrow a phrase from music – is contrapuntal.

158

Ibid. 178.

132

The exile is forced to embrace the foreign. Their new identity is always between “us” and
“outsider,” in a way that forces the exile to attempt to render the two harmonically. Thus,
the exile never fully belongs to each group and the successes of the exile engender the
successful synthesis between the dissonant groups.
This embodied synthesis is a recognizable piece of the survival and creative force
of the Jewish people. In a controversial but widely respected essay, Isaac Deutscher
identifies this historical Jewish subgroup as, “non-Jewish Jews.” He explores this
position through the parable of Rabbi Meir, one of the major sages in the Mishnah, and
Elisha Ben Abuyah, a heretic referred to as Acher “the Other One” Like any heretic, ben
Abuyah was not born a stranger. He was born into a family of wealth in Jerusalem and
placed on the path to Jewish scholarship, leaving this path for beliefs considered
heretical. Rabbi Meir, a voice of Mosaic orthodoxy, took lessons from Abuyah. On the
Sabbath, Meir would walk alongside Abuyah who, against the rules of the Sabbath, rode
a donkey. They would recite, teach, and argue, until they reached the ritual boundary
delineating how far Jews could travel of the sacred day. At this point, Abuyah would
continue beyond the boundary while Rabbi Meir would return home. Deutscher recounts
this bit of scripture to argue that, “the Jewish heretic who transcends Jewry belongs to a
Jewish tradition.”159
Deutscher associates this character of the “Other One” with the great Jewish
thinkers that shaped the world: Spinoza, Marx, Heine, Rosa Luxemburg, Walter
Benjamin, Freud, Arendt, and so on. The genesis of Jewish greatness, Deutscher
concludes, is the product of the exilic position:
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I do not believe in the exclusive genius of any race. Yet I think that in
some ways they were very Jewish indeed. They had in themselves
something of the quintessence of Jewish life and of the Jewish intellect.
They were a priori exceptional in that as Jews they dwelt on the
borderlines of various civilizations, religions and national cultures. They
were born and brought up on the borderlines of various epochs. Their
mind matured where the most diverse cultural influences crossed and
fertilized each other. They lived on the margins and nooks of respective
nations. Each of them was in society and yet not in it, of it and yet not of
it. It was this that enabled them to rise in thought above their societies,
above their nations, above their times and their generations, and to strike
out mentally into wide new horizons and far into the future.160
Like Said claims about exile, the Jewish genius is essentially musical. They create
harmonies between disparate times and places, peoples and cultures. From this thesis,
Deutscher makes two claims: these harmonies are always revolutionary, and therefore
always despised by those invested in power, and that this means that the Jew must
embrace their exilic character to serve as a permanently revolutionary figure working
toward universal human emancipation. The history of the Jew becomes the history of the
heretic, with all the lack of protection, scapegoating, and persecution that figure entails.
Deutscher’s uncompassionate, totalizing sentence that Jews must accept their duty
of perennial dissent and persecution is odds with his earlier working of the non-Jewish
Jew as a tradition within Judaism. Abuyah, the boundary-crossing heretic, functions
within the Jewish community through his interaction with Rabbi Meir, the official, public
figure. From different perspectives, the two live with one foot in heresy and one in
distinct communities. On the contrary, the Jewish geniuses Deutscher describes engage in
discourses with public figures analogous to Meir, but outside of the Jewish community.
His vision of Jewish genius, as the embodiment of permanent revolution lacks the
stability of any sort of Jewish belonging. Politically, the figure of the non-Jewish Jew
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who is at home no where and whose thought uproots the basis of reality is nearly opposite
to the Zionist’s New Jew, fully at home in Israel and affirming the truths of colonialism
and Eurocentrism. The argument Said delivers to both Deutscher and Zionism is that
there can be a society that exists between the two polar positions: to build a nation out of
exile. In other words, the power of Deutscher’s heretic comes from it’s critical vantage
point, which is only partially fueled by the recognition that it is privy to persecution.

7.3 The Mosaic Nation
As Jewish and non-Jewish thinkers have questioned the benefits and challenges of
belonging and exile for the Jewish people, the first founding of the Jewish nation out of
exiles, under Moses, has developed an eminent place as a point of reflection. First, in
Moses and Monothesism, Sigmund Freud employs psychoanalytic theory to explore the
Exodus story, in turn juxtaposing the biblical foundation of Israel to the Zionist
movement, which he by and large supported. Since its publication, the archeology Freud
based his analysis upon has been determined to be either partial, or false. However, as
Edward Said controversially examined in Freud and the Non-European, the dilemmas
Freud identified between the Jewish history of exile and contemporary belonging are still
the most pertinent.
Freud’s argument begins by asserting that Moses, the founder of Judaism and the
liberator of the Jewish people was himself Egyptian and that the legal system and religion
he brought to the Jewish people were derived from Egyptian monotheism. At the time of
liberation, the Jewish people worshiped a variety of polytheistic deities. Moses unites the
Jewish people under one universal God, who commands them, “You shall remember that
you were a slave in the land of Egypt, and the LORD your God redeemed you; therefore I
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command you this today. (Deut 15:15)” By introducing and enforcing Egyptian
Monotheism to the Jewish exiles, Moses creates the Jewish nation out of the Jewish
people and Egyptian religion. To achieve this task, Moses is forced to negate any direct
experiences the Jewish people have claimed to have with their deities. As a result, Moses
negates, or at least subverts, the sensual and spiritual aspects of both Jewish tradition and
Egyptian religion and creates a God who is primarily experienced internally through
intellectuality. This creation of an intellectual God who cannot be seen nor depicted
creates the platform for modern science, reason, and ethics. Importantly, this superiority
leads to local domination in Israel and the ability to dominate the indigenous Canaanite
populations.
After the historical evidence emerges which disconnected Freud’s interpretation
from any notion of scientific truth, Edward Said was able to treat this text as an exegesis
of Jewish ingenuity and belonging. For Said, Freud’s mission is clearly to impose
colonial fantasies on biblical narratives. The Exodus story becomes the creation of the
Occident from the Orient. Moses’s synthesis of Judaism from the religious and legal
frameworks of the Arab slaves and imperial Egypt creates the civilizational division
between East and West. On one hand, the rise of modern anti-Semitism from the roots of
European imperialism, “caused him [Freud] to protectively to huddle the Jews inside, so
the speak, the sheltering realm of the European.”161 On the other hand, his approach to
Jewish identity ran against the foundational assumptions of Zionism. “Freud mobilized
the non-European past in order to undermine any doctrinal attempt that might be made to
put Jewish identity on a sound foundational basis, whether religious or secular.”162
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Said connects Freud’s attempt to identify the, “unhoused,” powerfully creative
character of the Moses with the marginalized, uprooting character of Deutscher’s “nonJewish Jew.” They both place the dynamism and intersubjectivity of exile at the center of
civilization and the tidal-changes in human history. Deutscher illustrates this by
identifying the heretic as the generative character in much of Jewish thought. Freud
highlights this by showing that the basis for Jewish civilization derives from
heterogeneous, unsettled roots. Said writes:
Freud’s meditations and insistence on the non-European from a Jewish
point of view provide, I think, an admirable sketch of what it entails, by
way of refusing to resolve identity into some of the nationalist or religious
herds in which so many people want so desperately to run. More bold is
Freud’s profound exemplification of the insight that even for the most
definable, the most identifiable, the most stubborn communal identity –
for him, this was the Jewish identity – there are inherent limits that prevent
it from being fully incorporated into one, and only one, Identity. Freud’s
symbol of those limits was that the founder of Jewish identity was himself
a non-European Egyptian. In other words, identity cannot be thought or
worked through itself alone; it cannot constitute or even imagine itself
without that radical originary break or flaw which will not be repressed,
because Moses was Egyptian, and therefore always outside the identity
inside which so many have stood, and suffered – and later, perhaps, even
triumphed. The strength of this thought is, I believe, that it can be
articulated in and speak to other besieged identities as well – not through
dispensing palliatives such as tolerance and compassion but, rather, by
attending to it as a troubling, disabling, destabilizing secular wound – the
essence of the cosmopolitan, from which there can be no recovery, no
state of resolved or stoic calm, and no utopian reconciliation even within
itself. This is a necessary psychological experience, Freud says, but the
problem is that he doesn’t give any indication of how long it must be
tolerated or whether, properly speaking, it has a real history – history
being always that which comes after and, all too often, either overrides or
represses the flaw.163
Said’s point is deeply Arendtean. History can rarely tell us stories with the full spectrum
of intersubjective relationships. Instead, we imagine using archetypical and solid
subjectivities, which, in reality, never actually exist as solid whole, are always changing,
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and always inextricable from one another. The creative, self-organizing force Arendt
calls “political action,” and what Said represents in the longue durée as a “radical
originary break or flaw,” is always obscured and rarely, if ever, able to appear in history,
though it is the driving force of history.
Freud’s argument that Moses invented the Western tradition is false, but his
interpretation of the Exodus story to reach the historical and political conclusion Said
expanded upon still, if not more than before, ring true. The ancient land of Canaan laid at
the edge of the many empires of the Fertile Crescent, most famously the Egyptian,
Mesopotamian, Assyrian, and Phoenician. The hilly terrain of the land inhibited the use
of the war chariot, which served as the technological basis for imperial military
supremacy. As a consequence, Canaan was not only the home of indigenous tribes that
resisted imperial incorporation, but also the destination of many escaped slave
populations. As a result, Canaan contained the religious thought and narratives of a many
of the regional powers, but distinctly interpreted from the perspective of exiled slaves.
The religion Moses delivered to the Hebrews existed as fragments of these imperial
religions and exilic memories, along with the indigenous religion and social structure.
Freud’s argument that a historical, Egyptian Moses did exist and did lead a group
of slaves out of Egypt is true. However, the group he led formed a small component of
the future Israeli polity. Instead, Moses and the group of Egyptian slaves he lead were
important in confederating the local tribes and unifying their religious positions into a
more centralized system. As Anthony Ceresko writes, “this group was the element around
which other groups and stories could gather; its story became the appropriate vehicle for
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forging and expressing their new identity and common project.”164 Thus, as Freud wrote
Moses is a symbol of intersubjective synthesis, but not through the internalization of
religious experience. Moses fragmented and reassembled a variety of traditions and
identities to create the narrative basis for the Canaanite confederation.
The Exodus period was followed by the period of Judges, marked by violent
proto-genocidal tension within the federation. Within the book of Joshua, this period
appears as the ethnic cleansing of the Canaanite peoples. In reality, intratextual and
archeological evidence demonstrates the incorporation of different tribal groups into the
confederation and changing religious and cultural practices that affirm the integration.165
The first creation of Israel did not occur through exilic people entering the land and
cleaning it of its past and indigenous people. Instead, it canonized fragmentary narratives
to create a public space for a confederation of diverse peoples. In particular, it created
this intersubjective space by creating rituals, origin stories, and legal systems
“antithetical” to the empires around them.166 The story of the origins of the Israeli nation
was instructive to the opposing perspectives of Freud and Said. Within the story, Freud
found the means to liberate Jewish identity from the attempts of antisemites, Zionists, and
orthodoxy from any unambiguous history. Building on this notion, Said critiques Freud
for maintaining the Orientalist grid, even in his return to ambiguity, but emphasizes how
Freud’s notion of ambiguity has universal presence and power in the genesis of any
“people.” Within the historical and regional lens, the origins of the Jewish people were
ambiguous and, through both their ambiguity and social relation, oppositional to the
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imperial forces around them. Said’s comparison that exile and nationalism have a
relationship analogous to the master-slave dialectic, is fully realized in the relationship
between the recently liberated biblical Israelite and the surrounding empires. Like a
mosaic, the Jews built a nation out of fragments and discards. Through reformulation and
reorganization, distinct pieces become a new whole.

7.4 Glocalization and the Crisis of the Exilic Dialectic
This tension between the exile and nation has been intensified by the
contemporary phenomena social theorist term, “glocalization.” Best defined by Roland
Robertson as a rejection of reckless assumptions about the teleological homogenization
of the world through globalization, glocalization refers to coterminous processes of
homogenization and heterogenization.167 These processes are “complimentary and
interpenetrative,” simultaneously spreading characteristically local elements around the
globe, and localizing global and impersonal imperatives. On one hand this appears as the
expansion of Weber’s iron cage of bureaucracy, the creation of a “McWorld” with more
productive and expedited markets and more generic and universal products. On the other
hand, within each locale global products, peoples, and culture heterogenize the landscape,
demanding hybridization and rearticulating community inclusion and exclusion with
reference to the newcomers.
As a result of glocalization, the traditional taxonomies that defined belonging are
threatened, challenging persons who assumed their mode of belonging was not
questionable. Meanwhile, the development of transportation and communication
technologies, alongside the centralization of wealth and urbanization of the world’s
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population, has created conditions of human migration with increasing populations that
are, to some extent, exilic. While the clarity of the distinction between nation and exile
have decreased in clarity, the dialectic relationship remains and the tension of the
contradiction increases. The right to have rights applies to fewer people. Neoliberal
political sensibilities determine that even persons with citizenship, the formal declaration
of inclusion within a polity, lack belonging unless they can prove their own economic
productivity.168 While many people do not feel the effects of neoliberalism as a
recognizable form of exile, neoliberal politics inherently weaken the bond between the
individual and communal belonging, creating the pervading sense a looming potential to
not belong and that their membership is precarious.169 Glocalization and neoliberalization
have not only reduced the right to belong, but also heterogenized the experience of not
belonging.
As Enzo Traverso argues in The End of Jewish Modernity, these paradigmatic
changes have reframed internal and external discourses on Jewish belonging. Within the
last century, “the striking features of the Jewish diaspora – mobility, urbanity, textuality,
extraterritoriality – have extended to the globalized world, normalizing the minority that
formerly embodied them.”170 Within the diasporic context, Jewishness was conceived
through a Jewish relation to the state and hegemonic community. As a result, “its
modalities of existence very often preserved a religious anchorage and expressed a
specific demographic dynamic; they were inscribed in transnational economic networks
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and shared in a wide movement of European, even international, cultural transfer.” 171
This system of community, survival, and hybridization achieved two results. First, it
identified Jews as having a different relationship to the imagined homogeneity of the
national community, which was used to depict the Jew as paradigmatically duplicitous
and socially unclassifiable. Secondly, it formed the structural basis for Jewish
cosmopolitanism, embodied by Deutscher’s non-Jewish Jews.
By excavating the structural connection between globalization and Jewish
cosmopolitanism, Traverso argues that the Zionist worldview only became imaginable
through globalization.172 The “ingathering of exiles” only became a destiny once Jews
throughout Europe could communicate, travel, and publish throughout continental Jewish
networks, which allowed for the development of a Jewish imagined community. The
argument lacks the necessary evidence to argue this conclusively. However, by viewing
Zionism within Jewish history as the rejection of Jewish cosmopolitanism, Traverso can
describe Jewish nationalism as a sui generis phenomenon while the weight of Jewish
history posits a large anti-Zionist group of Jewish cosmopolitanism. In accordance, the
success of Zionism not only raises the question, “what future for Palestinians?” but also,
“what future for Jewish cosmopolitanism?” Simultaneously, as Traverso and Said concur,
globalization pluralizes Jewish cosmopolitanism. The structural base that produced the
type of thought, belief, and action that were characteristically Jewish, now include a
cadre of persons from different religious and ethnic groups.

7.5 The Jewish-Palestinian: Global Cosmopolitan
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The inextricable relationship between the future of Palestine and future of Jewish
cosmopolitanism constitutes the most fertile place to cultivate obligations and
compassion between Israeli Jews and Palestinians for a bi-national arrangement. The
obstacle preventing this from taking any life of its own is the ressentiment between the
Jew and the Arab. Ressentiment, as famously defined by Nietzsche, argues that the
genesis of problems that prevent action and produce stasis is, “when ressentiment itself
turns creative and gives birth to values: the ressentiment of those beings who, denied the
proper response of action compensate for it only with imaginary revenge.”173 For all his
flaws, Nietzsche’s sublimation of suffering pervades the Israel-Palestine conflict. No
ethos of exilic comradery can flourish without overcoming the fear and reproducing it
through forcing others to suffer. Contrapuntally, no just future can be reached without
reviving the right to remember a communal and distinct past.
Nietzsche offers half a solution to this dual problem that the stasis can only be
solved through both remembering and forgetting:
Everywhere that justice is practiced and maintained, the stronger power
can be seen looking for means of putting an end to the senseless ravages of
ressentiment amongst those inferior to it (whether groups of individuals),
partly by lifting the object of ressentiment out of the hands of revenge,
partly by substituting, for revenge, a struggle against the enemies of peace
and order, partly by working out compensation, suggesting, sometimes
enforcing it, and partly by promoting certain equivalences for wrongs into
a norm which ressentiment, from now on, has to take into account.174
The suffering of Palestinians and Jews does not need to be forgotten. It needs to be
revaluated from positions of mutuality and affinity that do not exist yet, but which can be
found in the history of Jewish cosmopolitanism, Arab anti-Eurocentrism, and exile.
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In practice, this Nietzschean idea appears as a “politics of becoming” As
Connolly writes, “to attend to the politics of becoming is to modify the cultural balance
between being and becoming without attempting the impossible, self-defeating task of
dissolving solid formations altogether.”175 To create an intersubjective sphere where Jews
and Palestinians, not only have access to the means of narration, but also engage to create
new and vital relationships, both groups must understand that “Jew” and “Palestinian” are
ambiguous and overlapping identity. The need to cohabitate means that the intersecting
perspective must be adopted. Again, following Nietzsche, this is achieved through a
mutual reading of suffering. “Indeed, becoming often proceeds from inchoate suffering
and hopes that are not crisply defined until a new identity has been forged though which
to measure those injuries retrospectively.”176 The Holocaust, the Nabka, and the suffering
of settler colonialism and its resistance must be understood though a shared lens. This
lens must be forged to illuminate the place of these two people in the, “struggle against
the enemies of peace and order.”177
When Gil Z. Hochberg decided to commemorate the late Edward Said, he turned
to an interview with Ari Shavit in Haaretz. Famously, Said concluded:
I'm the last Jewish intellectual. You don't know anyone else. All your
other Jewish intellectuals are now suburban squires. From Amos Oz to all
these people here in America. So I'm the last one. The only true follower
of Adorno. Let me put it this way: I'm a Jewish-Palestinian.
The comment synthesized Said’s uncompromising commitment to Palestinian liberation
with his compassion and sorrow for the Jewish people. Yet if the category of “Jewish175
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Palestinian” became the tool to amalgamate and compile a history of the two people, one
would find Said in grand company with world historic achievements in their résumé. This
category, in Said’s use synonymous with a “non-Jewish Jew,” must become the historical
organization of two peoples for Israel to return to politics. Jews and Palestinians must
remember their forgotten mutual history. The two groups demand the use of land as their
means of narration. To share it, they must recognize that the same moments, inseperable
from the land and a sense of place, belong to one another. As Hochberg’s testimony
concluded, in a paragraph that could have come from Arendt’s reflection on the life of
Walter Benjamin:
If memory is never fully or only one’s own, for it always necessitates
others…we can better understand Said’s insistence on memory as the site
of ethics and politics: a means for rethinking identity in terms of an
encounter with alterity, a reminder of the presence of the other within the
self. To continue to speak about the rivalry between the Israeli Jews and the
Palestinians in terms of a battle of memories between the two enclosed,
antagonistic, and independent narratives of loss is to overlook or forget the
central role the other plays (as a psychic factor) in the becoming of the self.
It is against this forgetting that Said repeatedly attempts to open the
political discourse to include not only the current reality in which the two
people already appear and function as two radically separate historical
entities with opposed political interests but also the “forgotten memory of
their becoming by means of repressed identification and enforced
separation.178
Just as politics implies the inescapability of the other, cohabitation demands the
intersecting narratives of sameness and difference. Israeli and Palestinian identities,
forged from the necessities and contradictions of the present are made from shared
historical material. Different present necessities demand the reinterpretation of these
identities. The revolutionary project of Palestinian liberation and non-Jewish Judaism
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entail the forceful admission of the Jewish-Palestinian into the Israeli sphere of
appearance.

7.6 Jewish Zen: The Conscious Pariah in the Age of Globalization
Unlike the principle of mutual exclusion, which Fanon places at the center of the
relationship between colonized and colonizer, Jews and Palestinians can occupy a single
intersubjective space. If one were to remove Zionist colonial ambition and the
disambiguating mandates of European nationalism, Jewish immigration to Palestine
would not be left without reason, but would appear like a refugee movement. Jewish
marginality within Europe became untenable, either temporarily or permanently, for
many Jews and they needed to find a place for sustainable belonging. Meanwhile,
Palestinians also suffer the consequences of marginality and an inability to lodge their
intersecting narratives within a global public. While the majority of Palestinian
marginality comes from Jewish domination, Arabs across the globe are marginalized.
Zionism itself is inextricable from marginalization of Arabs through colonialism, world
capitalism, and Orientalism.
Through their destructive relation to each other, Israelis and Palestinians share
similar relations to world systems that produce each group’s historical superfluity.
Returning to Arendt’s placement of the Jew, the exile, and the refugee between the
character of the Pariah and Parvenu, Zionism has chosen the strict path of the Parvenu,
fighting to become included in the acknowledged order. Israel can develop inclusive
stability by embracing the Jewish history of exclusion and marginality. However,
following Arendt’s response to Gershom Scholem, if the Jew understands their relation as
a product of their beliefs, not by virtue of birth, the Pariah community can extend beyond
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the ethnic identity. When Bernard Lazare, the first to use the term, insisted that Jews
understand the world around them through the lens of the conscious pariah, he referred to
their local European communities in which the Jew epitomized the face of the other. Now
that the basis for Jewish exceptionalism are less founded, as antisemitism has decreased
in the major global powers, the perspective of the conscious pariah become universal and
global. The Zionist project’s insistence that the Jews need a place to have the right to
have rights now extends to the global community of refugees, dissenters, and exiles.
To venture toward more concrete terms, this would be conceived as Israel using
its settlement building and military strength to house persons confronted with
placelessness in the global system. Not only would this mean offering Palestinians a
place in the system, it would also include extending the protections the Jews lacked so
recently lacked to dispossessed persons at a regional level, and becoming a center for
exilic thinking around the globe. This seems like an Israel that could not be further from
the contemporary state. Confronted with the Syrian civil war, one of the bloodiest and
merciless wars of the 21st century, Israel refused to accept any refugees. In the rise of the
far right, antisemitic groups celebrate Zionism and Israeli militarism for their acceptance
of xenophobia in military and social institutions.
However unimaginable, this vision of Israel as the global center of exilic culture
is neither utopian nor arbitrary. In modernity, Jews have been confronted with their own
ambiguity. Zionism has been a project of rejecting that ambiguity by hiding it in the
forests of the JNF and the memorials of the Holocaust. This image of exilic Israel
embodies the embrace of this ambiguity as opposed to its rejection. It is the bringing of
the “forgotten memories” of both Jewishness and Palestinianness into the public. Equally,
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if not more true than the Zionist solution, the embrace of exile is the alternative and the
undoing of Zionism. By offering Jews the freedom to not refine every action into an
unequivocal affirmation of recognizable place in the world, it brings to light the
contradictions of the Zionist project. Without a serious revaluation of Zionism to address
these failures, not only will the project become unsustainable, but it will internally
splinter and alienate global Jewry, and create new bases for anti-Jewish movements.
Crisis is coming for Zionism. If the Jewish people do not take into account the moments
we shunned alternatives to our contemporary untenable position, the result will be the
self-destructive xenophobia that served as the onus for the project itself.
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